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Highlights President Trump is as protectionist as Candidate Trump; USD shortage to tighten global financial conditions; Go Long MXN/RMB as a tactical play on U.S.-China trade war; Brexit risks are now overstated; EU will not twist the knife. EUR/GBP is overbought; go short. Feature "We assembled here today are issuing a new decree to be heard in every city, in every foreign capital, and in every hall of power. From this day forward, a new vision will govern our land. From this moment on, it's going to be America First." U.S. President Donald Trump, January 20, 2017, Inaugural Address What are the investment implications of an "America First" world? First, it may be useful to visualize the "America Second" world that President Trump is looking to leave in the rear-view mirror. Chart 1 shows the cost of hegemony. Since the Nixon shock in 1971, the U.S. has seen its trade balance deepen and its military commitments soar, in absolute terms. For President Donald Trump, the return on American investment has been low. Wasteful wars, crumbling infrastructure, decaying factories, stagnant wages, this is what the U.S. has to show for two decades of hegemony. Chart 1United States: The Cost Of Hegemony On the other hand, the U.S. has enjoyed the exorbitant privilege of its hegemonic position. In at least one major sense, America's allies (and China) are already paying for American hegemony: through their investments in U.S. dollar assets. Chart 2 illustrates this so-called "exorbitant privilege." Despite a deeply negative net international investment position, the U.S. has a positive net investment income.1 Chart 2The "Exorbitant Privilege" Being the global hegemon effectively lowers U.S. borrowing costs and domestic interest rates, giving U.S. policymakers and consumers an "interest rate they do not deserve." That successive administrations decided to waste this privilege on redrawing the map of the Middle East and giving the wealthiest Americans massive tax cuts, instead of rebuilding Middle America, is hardly the fault of the rest of the world! Foreigners hold U.S. assets because of the size of the economy, the sustainability and deep liquidity of the market, and the perceived stability of its political system. More importantly, they hold U.S. assets because the U.S. acts as both a global defender and a consumer of last resort. If Washington were to raise barriers to its markets and become a doubtful provider of security, states may gradually see less of a payoff in holding U.S. assets and decide to diversify more rapidly. Investors can interpret Trump's "America First" agenda broadly as an effort to dramatically reduce the U.S. current account deficit. Certainly we see his statements on renegotiating NAFTA, facing off against China on trade, and encouraging U.S. exports with tax legislation as parts of a broad effort aimed at improving the U.S. trade balance. If the U.S. were to pursue these protectionist policies aggressively, the end result would be a massive shortage of U.S. dollars globally, a form of global financial tightening. The rest of the world is not blind to the dangers of an America focused on reducing its current account deficit. According to the reporting of Der Spiegel magazine, Chancellor Angela Merkel sent several delegations to meet with the Trump team starting in 2015! No doubt Berlin was nervous hearing candidate Trump's protectionist talk, given that Germany runs one of the largest trade surpluses with the U.S. (Chart 3). In the last such meeting, taking place after the election was decided, Trump's son-in-law and White House advisor, Jared Kushner, asked the Germans a point-blank question, "What can you do for us?"2 In the 1980s, the U.S. asked West Germany and Japan the same question. The result was the 1985 Plaza Accord that engineered the greenback's depreciation versus the deutschmark and the yen (Chart 4). Recent comments from Donald Trump suggest that he would like to follow a similar script, where dollar depreciation does the heavy lifting in adjusting the country's current account deficit.3 Chart 3Trump's Black List Chart 4The Impact Of The Plaza Accord The Trump administration may have dusted off the Reagan playbook from the 1980s, but the world is playing a different game in 2017. First, the Soviet Union no longer exists and certainly no longer has more than 70,000 tanks ready to burst through the "Fulda Gap" towards Frankfurt. President Trump will find China, Germany, and Japan less willing to help the U.S. close its current account deficit, particularly if Trump continues his rhetorical assault on everything from European unity to Japanese security to the One China policy. Second, China, not U.S. allies Germany and Japan, has the largest trade surplus with the U.S. It is very difficult to see Beijing agreeing to a coordinated currency appreciation of the RMB, particularly when it is being threatened with a showdown over Taiwan and the South China Sea. Third, even if China wanted to kowtow to the Trump administration, it is not clear that RMB appreciation can be engineered. The country's capital outflows have swelled to a record level of $205 billion (Chart 5) and the PBoC has continued to inject RMB into the banking system via outright lending to banks and open-market operations (Chart 6). Unlike Japan in 1985, China is at the peak of its leveraging cycle and thus unwilling to see its currency - and domestic interest rates - appreciate. At best, Beijing can continue to fight capital outflows and close its capital account. But even this creates a paradox, since the U.S. administration can accuse it of currency manipulation even if such manipulation is preventing, not enabling, currency depreciation!4 Chart 5China: Unrecorded Capital Outflows Chart 6PBoC Injects Massive Liquidity To conclude, the world is (re)entering a mercantilist era and sits at the Apex of Globalization.5 The new White House is almost singularly focused on bringing the U.S. current account deficit down. It intends to do this by means of three primary tools: Protectionism: The Republicans in the House of Representatives have proposed a "destination-based border adjustment tax," which would effectively subsidize exports and tax imports. (It would levy the corporate tax on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs, thus giving a rebate to exporters who make revenues abroad while incurring costs domestically.)6 While the proponents of the new tax system argue it is equivalent to the VAT systems in G7 economies, the change would nonetheless undermine America's role as "the global consumer of last resort." In our view, it would be the opening salvo of a global trade war. Dirigisme: President Trump has not shied away from directly intervening to keep corporate production inside the U.S. He has also insisted on a vague proposal to impose a 35% "border tax" on U.S. corporates that manufacture abroad for domestic consumption. (Details are scant: His Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin has denied an across-the-board tax of this nature, but has confirmed that one would apply to specific companies.) Structural Demands: Trump's approach suggests that he wishes to force structural changes on trade surplus economies in order to correct structural imbalances in the American economy - and in this process he is not adverse to lobbing strategic threats. While he holds out the possibility of charging China with currency manipulation, in fact he can draw from a whole sheet of American trade grievances not limited to the currency to demand major changes to their trade relationship. The fundamental problem for the global economy is that in order to reduce the U.S. current account deficit, the world must experience severe global tightening. Dollars held by U.S. multinationals abroad, which finance global credit markets, will come back to the U.S. and tighten liquidity abroad. And emerging market corporate borrowers who have overextended themselves borrowing in U.S. dollars will struggle to repay debts in appreciating dollars. These structural trends are set to exacerbate an already ongoing cyclical process. As BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy has recently pointed out, global demand for U.S. dollars is rising faster than the supply of U.S. dollars.7 Our EM team's first measure of U.S. dollar liquidity is "the sum of the U.S. monetary base and U.S. Treasury securities held in custody for official and international accounts." The second measure "is the sum of the U.S. monetary base and U.S. Treasury securities held by all foreign residents." As Chart 7 and Chart 8 illustrate, both calculations indicate that dollar liquidity is in a precipitous decline already. Meanwhile, foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities is contracting, while the amount of U.S. Treasury securities held by all foreigners has stalled (Chart 9). Chart 7Dollar Liquidity Declining... Chart 8... Any Way You Look At It Chart 9Components Of U.S. Dollar Liquidity Chart 10It Hurts To Borrow In USD Concurrently, U.S. dollar borrowing costs continue to rise (Chart 10). Our EM team expects EM debtors with U.S. dollar liabilities to either repay U.S. dollar debt or hedge it. This will ultimately increase the demand for U.S. dollars in the months ahead. Near-term U.S. dollar appreciation will only reinforce and accelerate the mercantilist push in the White House and Congress. President Trump and the GOP in the House will find common ground on the border-adjustment tax, which Trump recently admitted he did not understand or look favorably upon. The passage of the law, or some such equivalent, has a much greater chance than investors expect. So does a U.S.-China trade war, as we argued last week.8 How should investors position themselves for the confluence of geopolitical, political, and financial factors we have described above? The world is facing both the cyclical liquidity crunch that BCA's Emerging Markets Team has elucidated and the potential for a secular tightening as the Trump administration focuses its efforts on closing the U.S. current account deficit. Five investment implications are top of our mind: Chart 11Market Response To Trump Win On High End Chart 12Market Is Priced For 'Magnificent' Events Buy VIX. The S&P 500 has continued to power on since the election, buoyed by positive economic surprises, strong global earnings, and the hope of a pro-business shift in the White House. The equity market performance puts the Trump presidency in the upper range of post-election market outcomes (Chart 11). However, with 10-year Treasuries back above fair value, the VIX near 12, and EM equities near their pre-November high, the market is pricing none of the political and geopolitical risks of an impending trade war between the U.S. and China, nor is it pricing the general mercantilist shift in Washington D.C. (Chart 12). As a result, we recommend that clients put on a "mercantilist hedge," like deep out-of-the-money S&P 500 puts, or VIX calls. For instance, a long VIX 20/25 call spread for March expiry. Long DM / Short EM. Mercantilism and the U.S. dollar bull market are the worst combination possible for EM risk assets. We therefore reiterate our long-held strategic recommendation of being long developed markets / short emerging markets. Overweight Euro Area Equities. Investors should overweight euro area equities relative to the U.S. As we have discussed in the 2017 Strategic Outlook, political risks in Europe this year are a red herring.9 We will expand on the upcoming French elections in next week's report. Meanwhile, investors appear complacent about protectionism and what it may mean for the S&P 500, which sources 44% of its earnings abroad. European companies, on the other hand, could stand to profit from a China-U.S. trade war. Chart 13Peso Is A Buy Versus Trump's Enemy #1 Chart 14Peso As Cheap As During Tequila Crisis Long MXN/RMB. As a tactical play on the U.S.-China trade war, we recommend clients go long MXN/RMB (Chart 13). The peso is now as cheap as it was in early 1995, at the heights of the Tequila Crisis, as per the BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy model (Chart 14). While Mexico remains squarely in Trump's crosshairs on immigration and security, the damage to the currency appears to be done and has ironically made the country's exports more competitive. In addition, Trump's pick for Commerce Secretary, Wilbur Ross, has informed his NAFTA counterparts that "rules of origin" will be central to NAFTA re-negotiation. This can be interpreted as the U.S. using every tool at its disposal to impose punitive measures on China, including forcing NAFTA partners to close off the "rules of origin" loophole.10 But the reality is that the U.S. trade deficit with its NAFTA partners is far less daunting than that with China (Chart 15). Meanwhile, we remain negative on the RMB for fundamental reasons that we have stressed in our research. Small Is Beautiful. We continue to recommend that clients find protection from rising protectionism in small caps. Small caps are traditionally domestically geared irrespective of their domicile. Anastasios Avgeriou, Chief Strategist of BCA's Global Alpha Sector Strategy, also points out that small caps in the U.S. will benefit as the new administration follows through with promised corporate tax cuts, which will benefit small caps disproportionally to large caps given that the effective tax rate of multinationals is already low. Moreover, small companies will benefit most from any cuts in regulations, most of which have been written by multinationals in order to create barriers to entry (Chart 16). Of course, we could just be paranoid! After all, much of Trump's proposed policies - massive tax cuts, infrastructure spending, major rearmament, the border wall - would increase domestic spending and thus widen the current account deficit, not shrink it. And all the protectionism and de-globalization could just be posturing by the Trump administration, both to get a better deal from China and Europe and to give voters in the Midwest some political red meat. Chart 15China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs Chart 16Small Is Beautiful But Geopolitical Strategy analysts get paid to be paranoid! And we worry that much of Trump's promises that would widen U.S. deficits are being watered down or pushed to the background. Yes, we have held a high conviction view that infrastructure spending would come through, but now it appears that it will be complemented with significant spending cuts. The next 100 days will tell us which prerogatives the Trump Administration favors: rebuilding America directly, or doing so indirectly via protectionism. If the former, then the current market rally is justified. If the intention is to reduce the current account deficit, look out. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President marko@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com Brexit: A Brave New World Miranda: O brave new world! Prospero: 'Tis new to thee. — Shakespeare, The Tempest The U.K. Supreme Court ruled on January 24 that parliament must have a say in triggering Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which enables the U.K. to "exit" the European Union. This decision, as well as Theresa May's January 17 "Brexit means exit" speech, caught us in London while visiting clients. Reactions were mixed. The pound continues to rally. January 16 remains the low point in the GBP/USD cross since the vote to leave on June 23 last year (Chart 17). Chart 17Has Brexit Uncertainty Bottomed? Should investors expect more downside to the pound or do the recent events mark a bottom in political uncertainty? The market consensus suggests that further volatility in the pound is warranted for three reasons: Europeans will seek to punish the U.K. for Brexit, to set an example to their own Euroskeptics; Prime Minister May's assertion that the U.K. would seek to exit the common market is negative for the country's economy; Legal uncertainties about Brexit remain. We disagree with this assessment, at least in the short and medium term. Therefore, the pound rally on the day of May's speech was warranted, although we agree that exiting the EU Common Market will ultimately be suboptimal for the country's economy. First, by setting out a clean break from the EU, including the common market, Prime Minister May has removed a considerable amount of political uncertainty. As we pointed out in our original net assessment of Brexit, leaving the EU while remaining in its common market is illogical.11 Paradoxically, the U.K. stood to lose rather than regain sovereignty if it left the EU yet remained in the common market (Diagram 1). Diagram 1The Quite Un-British Lack Of Common Sense Behind Soft Brexit Why? Because membership in the common market entails a financial burden, full adoption of the acquis communautaire (the EU body of law), and acceptance of the "Four Freedoms," including the freedom of movement of workers. Given that the Brexit vote was largely motivated by concerns of sovereignty and immigration (Chart 18), it did not make sense to vote to leave the EU and then seek to retain membership in the common market. Apparently May and her cabinet agree. Chart 18It's Sovereignty, Stupid! Second, now that the U.K. has chosen to depart from the common market, the EU no longer needs to take as hostile of a negotiating position as before. The EU member states were not going to let the U.K. dictate its own terms of membership. That would have set a precedent for future Euroskeptic governments looking for an alternative relationship with the bloc, i.e. the so-called "Europe, à la carte" that European policymakers dread. But now that the U.K. is asking for a clean exit, with a free trade agreement to be negotiated in lieu of common market membership, the EU has less reason to punish London. An FTA arrangement will be beneficial to EU exporters, who want access to the U.K. market, and it will send a message to Euroskeptics on the continent that there is no alternative to full membership. Leaving the EU means leaving the market and falling back - at best - to an FTA-level relationship that the EU shares with Mexico and (most recently) Canada. Third, leaving the EU and the common market are political, not legal, decisions, and the lingering legal battles are neither avoidable nor likely to be substantive. Theresa May had already stolen thunder when she said that the final deal with the EU would be put to a vote in parliament. The Supreme Court ruling - as well as other legal hangups - could conceivably give rise to complications that bind the government's hands, but most likely parliament will pass a simple bill or motion granting permission for the government to invoke Article 50. That is because the referendum, and public opinion since then, speak loud and clear (Chart 19). The Conservative Party remains in a comfortable lead over the Labour Party (Chart 20), which itself is not opposing the referendum outcome. In addition, the House of Commons has already approved the government's Brexit timetable by a margin of 372 seats in a 650-seat body - with 461 ayes. That is a stark contrast with a few months ago when around 494 MPs were said to be against Brexit. Chart 19No 'Bremorse' Or 'Bregret' Chart 20Tories Still Triumphant The bigger question comes down to the parliamentary vote on the deal that is to be negotiated over the next two years. Could the Parliament vote down the final agreement with the EU? Absolutely. However, it is unlikely. The economic calamity predicted by many commentators has not happened, as we discuss below. Bottom Line: The combination of the Supreme Court decision and Prime Minister May's speech has reduced political uncertainty regarding Brexit. The EU will negotiate hard with the U.K., but the main cause of consternation - the U.K. asking for special treatment with respect to the common market - is now off the table. Yes, the EU does hold all the cards when it comes to negotiating an FTA agreement, and the process could entail some alarming twists and turns (given the last-minute crisis in the EU-Canada FTA). But we do not expect EU-U.K. negotiations to imperil the pound dramatically beyond what we've already seen. Will Leaving The Common Market Hurt Britain? Does this mean that Brexit is "much ado about nothing?" In the short and medium term, we think the answer is yes. In the long-term, leaving the EU Common Market is a suboptimal outcome for three reasons: Trade - Net exports rarely contribute positively to U.K. growth (Chart 21) and the trade deficit with the EU is particularly deep. As such, proponents of Brexit claim that putting up modest trade barriers against the EU could be beneficial. However, the U.K. has a services trade surplus with the EU (Chart 22). While it is not as large as the trade deficit, there was hope that the eventual implementation of the 2006 EU's Services Directive would have opened up new markets for U.K.'s highly competitive services industry and thus reduced the trade deficit over time. As the bottom panel of Chart 22 shows, the U.K.'s service exports to the rest of the world have outpaced those to the EU, suggesting that there is much room for improvement. This hope is now dashed and the EU may go back to putting up non-tariff barriers to services that reverse Britain's modest surplus with the bloc. Free Trade Agreements rarely adequately cover services, which means that the U.K.'s hope of expanding service exports to a new high is probably gone. Chart 21U.K. Is Consumer-Driven Chart 22Service Exports At Risk After Brexit Foreign Investment - FDI is declining, whether for cyclical reasons or because foreign companies fear losing access to Europe via the U.K. It remains to be seen how FDI will respond to the U.K.'s renunciation of the common market, but it is unlikely to be positive (Chart 23). The U.K.'s financial sector will also be negatively impacted since leaving the common market will mean that London will no longer have recourse to the EU judiciary in order to stymie European protectionism.12 This is unlikely to destroy London's status as the global financial center, but it will impact FDI on the margin. Labor Growth - The loss of labor inflow will be the biggest cost of Brexit. A decrease of immigration from the EU could reduce the U.K.'s labor force growth by a maximum of two-thirds, translating to a 25% loss in the potential GDP growth rate (Chart 24). While the U.K. is not, in fact, closing off all immigration, labor-force growth will decline, and potential GDP with it. Chart 23FDI To Suffer From Brexit? Chart 24Labor Growth Suffers Most From Brexit In addition, the EU Common Market forces companies to compete for market share in the developed world's largest consumer market. This competition is supposed to accelerate creative destruction and thus productivity, while giving the winners of the competition the spoils, i.e. a better ability to establish "economies of scale." In a 2011 report, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) published an econometric study that compared four scenarios: the U.K. remains in the common market as the EU fully liberalizes trade; the U.K. remains in the EU's single market, but does not fully liberalize trade with the rest of the EU; the U.K. leaves the common market; the U.K. enters NAFTA.13 Of the four scenarios, only the first leads to an increase in wealth for the U.K., with 7.1% additional GDP over ten years. U.K. exports would increase by 47%, against 38.1% for its imports. Wages of both skilled and unskilled workers would increase as well. Meanwhile, the report finds that closer integration with NAFTA would not compensate for looser U.K. ties with the EU. In fact, the U.K. national income would be 7.4% smaller if the U.K. tied up with NAFTA instead of taking part in further trade liberalization on the continent. Why rely on a 2011 report for the assessment of benefits of the common market? Because it was written by a competent, relatively unbiased international body and predates the highly politicized environment surrounding Brexit that has since infected almost all think-tank research. And yet the more recent research echoes the 2011 report in terms of the negative consequences of leaving the common market.14 In addition, the BIS study actually attempts to forecast the benefit of further removing trade barriers in the single market, which is at least the intention of the EU Commission. That said, our concerns regarding the U.K. economy are long-term. It may take years before the full economic impact of leaving the common market can be assessed. In addition, much of our analysis hinges on the Europeans fully liberalizing the common market and removing the last remaining non-tariff barriers to trade, particularly of services. At the present-day level of liberalization, the U.K. may benefit by leaving. In addition, we do not expect a balance-of-payments crisis in the U.K. any time soon. The U.K. current account is deeply negative, unsurprisingly so given the deep trade imbalance with the EU and world. However, our colleague Mathieu Savary, Vice-President of BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy, has pointed out that the elasticity of imports to the pound is in fact negative, a very surprising result. This reflects an extremely elevated import content of British exports. A lower pound is therefore unlikely to be the most crucial means of improving the current-account position. Certainly leaving the common market will not improve the competitiveness of British exports in the EU. Chart 25The U.K.'s Basic Balance Is Healthy But this raises a bigger question: why does the U.K. have to improve its current account deficit? As our FX team points out in Chart 25, despite having a current-account deficit of nearly 6% of GDP, the U.K. runs a basic balance-of-payments surplus of 12%, even after the recent fall in FDI inflows. The reason for the massive balance-of-payments surplus is the financial account surplus of 6.17% of GDP, a feature of the U.K. being a destination for foreign capital, which flows from its status as a global financial center and prime real estate destination. In other words, leaving the common market will not change the fundamentals of the U.K. balance of payments much. The country will remain a global financial center and will still run a capital account surplus, which will suppress the country's interest rates, buoy the GBP, and give tailwinds to imports of foreign goods. Meanwhile, exports will not benefit as they will face marginally higher tariffs as the country exits the EU Common Market. At best, new tariffs will be offset by a cheaper GBP. As such, leaving the common market is not going to be a disaster for the U.K. Nor will it be a panacea for the country's deep current account deficit. And that is okay. The U.K. will not face a crisis in funding its current account deficit. What is clear is that for the time being, the U.K. economy is holding up. Our forex strategists recently argued that U.K.'s growth has surprised to the upside and that the improvement is sustainable: Monetary and fiscal policy are both accommodative (Chart 26); Inflation is limited; Tight labor market drives up wages and puts cash in consumers' pockets (Chart 27); Credit growth remains robust (Chart 28). Chart 26Easy Money Smooths The Way To Brexit Chart 27British Labor Market Tightening Chart 28U.K. Credit Growth Looking Good This means that the political trajectory is set for the time being. "Bremorse" and "Bregret" will remain phantoms for the time being. Bottom Line: Leaving the common market is a suboptimal but not apocalyptic outcome for the U.K. The combination of decent economic performance and lowered political uncertainty in the near term will support the pound. Given the pound's 20% correction since the June referendum, we believe that the market has already priced in the new, marginally negative, post-Brexit paradigm. The Big Picture It is impossible to say whether the long-term negative economic effects of Brexit will affect voters drastically enough and quickly enough for Scotland, or parliament, to act in 2018 or 2019 and modify the government's decision to pursue a "Hard Brexit." It seems conceivable if something changes in the fundamental dynamics outlined above, but we wouldn't bet on it. At the moment even a new Scottish referendum appears unlikely (Chart 29). Scottish voters have soured on independence, perhaps due to a combination of continued political uncertainty in the EU (Scotland's political alternative to the U.K.) and a collapse in oil prices (arguably Scotland's economic alternative to the U.K.). The issue is not resolved but on ice for the time being. Chart 29Brexit Not Driving Scots To Independence (Yet) More likely, the government will get its way on Brexit and the 2020 elections will mark a significant popular test of the Conservative leadership and the final deal with the EU. Then the aftermath will be an entirely new ballgame for the U.K. and all four of its constituent nations. If Britain's new beginning is founded on protectionism and dirigisme - as the government suggests - then the public is likely to be disappointed. The "brave new world" of Brexit may prove to be rather mundane, disappointing, and eerily reminiscent of the ghastly 1970s.15 Hence the Shakespeare quote at the top of this report. The political circumstances of Brexit resemble the U.K. landscape before it joined the European Economic Community in 1973: greater government role in the economy, trade protectionism, tight labor market, higher wages, and inflation. Yet this was a period when the U.K. economy underperformed Europe's. The U.K.'s eventual era of outperformance was contingent on the structural reforms of the Thatcher era and expanded access to the European market (Chart 30). It remains to be seen what happens when the U.K. leaves the market and rolls back Thatcherite reforms. The weak pound and proactive fiscal policy will fail to create a manufacturing revolution. That is because most manufacturing has hollowed out because of automation, not foreign workers stealing Britons' jobs. Moreover, as for the pound, it is important to remember that currency effects are temporary and any boost to exports that the weak pound is generating will be short-lived, as with the case of China in the 1990s and the EU in the past two years (Chart 31). Chart 30U.K. Growth To Lag Europe's Once Again? Chart 31Export Boost From Devaluation Is Fleeting In addition, we would argue that, in an environment of de-globalization - in which tariffs are rising, albeit slowly for the time being (Chart 32) - the EU Common Market provides Europe with a mechanism by which to protect its vast consumer market. The U.K. may have chosen the precisely wrong time in which to abandon the protection of continental European protectionism. It could suffer by finding itself on the outside of the common market as global tariffs begin to rise significantly. Chart 32Protectionism On The March What about the restoration of the "Special Relationship" between the U.K. and the U.S.? Could moving to the "front of the queue" on negotiating an FTA with the world's largest economy make a difference for the U.K.? Perhaps, but as the BIS study above indicates, an FTA with North America or the U.S. alone is unlikely to replace the benefits of the common market. In addition, it is difficult to imagine how a protectionist U.S. administration that is looking to massively decrease its current account deficit will help the U.K. expand trade with the U.S. By contrast, Trump's election in the United States poses massive risks to globalization, both through his protectionism and the strong USD implications of his core policies. This will reverberate negatively across the commodities and EM space. In such an environment, the U.K. may not be able to make much headway in its "Global Britain" initiatives to conclude fast trade deals with EM economies that stand to lose the most in the de-globalization era. Bottom Line: As a trading nation, the U.K. is likely to lose out in a prolonged period of de-globalization. Membership in the EU could have served as a bulwark against this global trend. Investment Implications We diverge from our colleagues in the Foreign Exchange Strategy and European Investment Strategy when it comes to the assessment of political risk looming over Brexit.16 The decision to leave the common market will alleviate the pressure on Europeans to seek vindictive punishment. Earlier, the U.K. was forcing them to choose between making an exception to the rules and demonstrating the negative consequences of leaving the bloc. Now the U.K. is self-evidently taking on its own punishment - the economic burden of leaving the common market - and the EU will probably deem that sufficient. Will the EU play tough? Yes, especially since the EU retains considerable economic leverage over Britain (Chart 33). But the stakes are far smaller now. Furthermore, investors should remember that core European states - especially France and Germany - remain major military allies of the U.K. and will continue to be deeply intertwined economically. As such, we believe that the pound has already priced in the new economic paradigm and that the expectations of political uncertainty ahead of the U.K.-EU negotiations may be overdone. We therefore recommend that investors short EUR/GBP outright. Our aforementioned forex strategist Mathieu Savary argues that, on an intermediate-term basis, the outlook for this cross is driven by interest rate differentials and policy considerations. Due to the balance-sheet operations conducted by the BoE and ECB, interest rates in the U.K. and the euro area do not fully reflect domestic policy stances. Instead, Mathieu uses the shadow rates. Currently, shadow rates unequivocally point toward a lower EUR/GBP (Chart 34). In fact, balance-sheet dynamics point toward shorting EUR/GBP. Chart 33EU Holds The Cards In FTA Negotiation Chart 34Shadow Rates Point To Stronger GBP For full disclosure, Mathieu cautions clients to wait on executing a short EUR/GBP until after Article 50 is enacted. By contrast, we think that political uncertainty regarding Brexit likely peaked on January 16. Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President marko@bcaresearch.com 1 While the U.S. runs a massively negative net international investment position, its net international income remains positive. In other words, foreigners receive a much lower return on U.S. assets while the U.S. benefits from risk premia in foreign markets. 2 Please see Spiegel Online, "Donald Trump and the New World Order," dated January 20, 2017, available at Spiegel.de. 3 In a widely-quoted interview with The Wall Street Journal, Donald Trump said that the U.S. dollar is "too strong." He continued that, "Our companies can't compete with [China] now because our currency is too strong. And it's killing us." Please see The Wall Street Journal, "Donald Trump Warns on House Republican Tax Plan," dated January 16, 2017, available at wsj.com. 4 We would note that the Trump administration and its Treasury Department have considerable leeway over how they choose to interpret China's foreign exchange practices. In 1992, when the U.S. government last accused China of currency manipulation, it issued a warning in its spring report before leveling the accusation in the winter report. The RMB did not depreciate in the meantime but remained stable, and Treasury noted this approvingly; however, Treasury chose 1989 as the base level for its assessment, and found manipulation. The Trump administration could use much more aggressive interpretive methods than this to achieve its ends. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Mercantilism Is Back," dated February 10, 2016, and Special Report, "The Apex Of Globalization - All Downhill From Here," dated November 14, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017," dated January 20, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "The U.S. Dollar's Uptrend And China's Options," dated January 11, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin," dated January 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Critics, including Trump supporters, claim that NAFTA sets too low of a threshold for the domestic content of a good deemed to have originated within the NAFTA countries. Goods that are nearly 40% foreign-made can thus be treated as NAFTA-made. This is one of many contentious points in the trade deal. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and European Investment Strategy Special Report, "With Or Without You: The U.K. And The EU," dated March 17, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 In 2015, the U.K. took the ECB to court over its decision to require financial transactions denominated in euros to be conducted in the euro area, i.e. out of the City, and won. This avenue of legal redress will no longer be available for the U.K., allowing EU member states to slowly introduce rules and regulations that corral the financial industry - or at least to the parts focused on transactions in euros - out of London. 13 Please see Bank of International Settlements, "The economic consequences for the U.K. and the EU of completing the Single Market," BIS Economics Paper No. 11, dated February 2011, available at www.gov.uk. 14 Please see Her Majesty's Government, "H.M. Treasury Analysis: The Long-Term Economic Impact Of EU Membership And The Alternatives," Cmnd. 9250, April 2016, available at www.gov.uk. and Jagjit S. Chadha, "The Referendum Blues: Shocking The System," National Institute Economic Review 237 (August 2016), available at www.niesr.ac.uk. 15 We were going to use "grey" to describe Britain in the 1970s. However, our colleague Martin Barnes, BCA's Chief Economist, insisted that "grey" did not do the "ghastly" 1970s justice. When it comes to the U.K. in the 1970s, we are going to defer to Martin. 16 Please see BCA Research European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “May’s Brexit Speech: No Substance,” dated January 19, 2017, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Geopolitical Calendar
After the election, machinery stocks jumped sharply on the hope that only Trump's growth-oriented policies will be successful while growth-restrictive proposals will be watered down, supporting commodity prices and ultimately reinvigorating machinery demand. However, the risk is that the waiting period will prove longer than expected, testing investor patience. While global manufacturing surveys have perked up on the back of inventory restocking, global machinery orders are still sinking, and U.S. machinery new orders are contracting. The strong U.S. dollar makes it dangerous to extrapolate firming global surveys into strong U.S. corporate performance. The chart shows that relative machinery EPS estimates have moved in the opposite direction of relative share prices. As a result, the bottom panel of the chart shows that relative valuations have skyrocketed. The S&P machinery sector's forward P/E is now trading at a 20% premium to the broad market (over a two decade high, excluding the Great Recession) spiking 6% since November. If earnings fail to live up to extremely optimistic expectations, as we expect, then relative share prices are at risk of a retracement. Bottom Line: Continue to underweight the S&P machinery index.
Chemicals stocks have significantly underperformed the broad market since our underweight call in 2014, pulled lower by the soaring U.S. dollar and sagging industry productivity. Net earnings revisions have been consistently revised lower over the past few years, and are unlikely to recover without a reflationary push that revives chemical final demand (global real yields are shown inverted, second panel). However, global manufacturing improvement seems likely to accrue mostly to firms outside the U.S. German chemical new orders have surged, and the IFO survey of chemical industry executives signals optimism about the future. U.S. executives appear to be equally confident, but that optimism is misplaced. The American Chemical Council expects U.S. chemical exports to increase 7% a year through 2021. Over $170B is expected to be invested in U.S. chemical manufacturing capacity, representing nearly 25% of the total industry size, which is anticipated to boost the chemical trade surplus to new records. So far, roughly $76B of projects has either been completed or is under construction. If these planned projects all come to fruition, our concern is that new capacity will be idle rather than productive. Capacity is already growing much faster than output, unleashing significant deflationary and productivity-draining forces. We expect chemicals stocks to continue to lag the broad market. Stay clear and please see yesterday's Weekly Report for more details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CHEM - APD, ARG, CF, DOW, EMN, ECL, DD, FMC, IFF, LYB, MON, MOS, PPG, PX, SHW.
Media stocks are on track to set new relative performance highs. Media sales growth is in recovery mode. Consumers have significantly boosted spending on media services, as measured by personal consumption expenditures data. Pricing power has surged in response to demand strength (bottom panel). In turn, strong demand is boosting measures of productivity: our proxy for sales/employment is accelerating toward the double-digit growth zone. Productivity is diverging positively from relative forward earnings expectations, implying there is room for a re-rating. As long as the U.S. economy is growing, media companies should be able to garner an increasing share of consumer wallets. Real spending on media services has been in a steady uptrend for well over a decade, reflecting its ability to continually innovate, only pausing during recessions when consumers are forced to retrench. Rising spending underscores that pricing power gains are sustainable (bottom panel). Stay overweight, and please refer to yesterday's Weekly Report for more details.
Special Report Dear client, We have received several questions about a potential U.S. border tax adjustment. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President of BCA's Global Investment Strategy service addresses this issue in the attached Special Report titled, "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017". Peter analyses the economic and financial market implications of the plan and concludes it is likely to be an additional support to the dollar bull market should it be implemented in full. We trust you will find this report very interesting and relevant. As always, please do not hesitate if you have further questions. Best regards, Lenka Martinek Highlights House Republicans are pushing for a radical overhaul of the existing tax code, including adding a "border adjustment" mechanism that would effectively subsidize exports and tax imports. Despite President Trump's apparent mixed feelings about border taxation, we see a 50% chance that some version of the proposal will be implemented. This is a higher probability than the market currently is discounting. The trade-weighted dollar will rally by another 5% even in the absence of any tax changes, but could rise by 15% if the border adjustment tax is introduced. If the latter were to happen, it would take some time for the dollar to rise to its new equilibrium level. This, in conjunction with sticky import and export prices, would likely lead to a temporary narrowing of the U.S. trade deficit. Such an outcome could prompt the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would. Investors should underweight U.S. bonds on a currency-hedged basis. A stronger dollar will push down commodity prices and hurt external borrowers with dollar-denominated loans. A protectionist backlash against the U.S. might ensue. We are closing our long Chinese banks trade for a gain of 32%, and our long RUB/USD trade for a gain of 20%. Feature Making The Tax Code Great Again? Republicans in Congress are proposing an ambitious revamp of the tax code. A central element of their plan is the replacement of the existing corporate income tax with a so-called "destination-based cash flow tax." Key features of this plan include: Cutting the current federal corporate tax from a top rate of 35% to 20%. Allowing businesses to depreciate capital expenditures immediately, rather than writing them off over many years. Disallowing businesses from deducting interest expenses when calculating their tax bills. Moving to a system of territorial taxation, meaning that taxes would only be assessed on the value added of goods consumed in the United States. Since not all goods that are produced in the U.S. are consumed in the U.S., and not all goods that are consumed in the U.S. are produced in the U.S., a destination-based system requires what is known as a "border adjustment." Such an adjustment would tax the value added of imports and rebate the value added of exports at an equivalent rate. While border adjustments are routinely used in other settings - most notably by countries that have VATs - their application to corporate income taxes is a novel idea. As such, it is not surprising that the proposal has generated significant confusion among investors. With that in mind, we offer our thoughts on the matter using a Q&A format. Q: How exactly would a border adjustment on corporate income taxes work? A: Under current U.S. law, corporate income taxes are assessed on worldwide profits, which are the difference between worldwide revenues and worldwide costs. The introduction of a border tax adjustment would change the tax system to one where taxes are assessed only on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs (i.e., revenues derived in the U.S. minus costs incurred in the U.S.). Table 1 offers a simplified example to illustrate this point. Consider three types of companies: 1) A purely domestic producer whose revenues and costs are realized at home; 2) An exporter whose revenues are entirely derived from abroad but whose costs are all incurred in the U.S.; 3) An importer whose revenues are completely generated in the U.S. but whose costs are all incurred abroad. Suppose that all three companies have revenues of $100 and costs of $60 - implying $40 in pre-tax profits - and face a corporate tax rate of 20%. Before the border adjustment, each company would pay a tax of $8 ($40 times 0.2). The border adjustment is zero for the domestic producer. However, it would impose an additional tax of $12 on the importer ($60 times 0.2), while giving the exporter a rebate of $20 ($100 times 0.2). In the end, the importer and exporter face final tax bills of $20 and -$12, respectively, while the domestic producer continues to pay $8. Note that this conforms with the tax paid on domestic revenues minus domestic costs (for the domestic producer, domestic revenue minus domestic cost is equal to $40; for the exporter it is equal to -$60; and for the importer, it is equal to $100). Q: A tax on imports and a subsidy on exports? Sounds like massive protectionism! A: That depends on the extent to which the dollar appreciates. As Table 1 shows, if the dollar appreciates by 1/(1-tax rate) = 1/(1-0.2) = 25%, there would be no impact on the trade balance or on the distribution of after-tax corporate profits in the economy. This is because the stronger dollar would nullify the subsidy on exports, while reducing import costs by precisely the amount necessary to restore importers' after-tax profits to their original level. Q: This seems like splitting hairs. If a country imposes a 20% tax on imports, most people would still regard this as a protectionist act, even if a currency appreciation offsets the impact. A: That's why a corresponding export subsidy is necessary. That may sound strange since export subsidies are also seen as protectionist measures, but consider the following: Imagine that the government only taxes imports. A tax on imports would curb import demand, implying less demand for foreign currency. This would push up the value of the dollar, leading to lower import prices. How high would the dollar go? Suppose it rose so much that the decline in import prices exactly offset the tariff, thereby restoring import volumes (and importer profits) back to their original level. Is that a stable equilibrium? The answer is no because a stronger dollar would also reduce the demand for U.S. exports, causing the trade deficit to swell. Thus, for the trade balance to remain unchanged, the dollar would have to rise only part of the way, leaving importers worse off than before the tariff was introduced. Such a policy would be protectionist because it would favor U.S.-based companies that produce for the domestic market over foreign exporters. Only in the case where importers are subject to a tax and exporters receive a subsidy will the dollar strengthen to the point that neither exports nor imports change. Intuitively, this is because an export subsidy indirectly benefits importers by pushing up the value of the dollar, while directly benefiting exporters by offsetting the effect of a stronger dollar on profits. Q: If there is no change in the trade balance, what is the advantage of border-adjusting the corporate income tax? A: Contrary to Donald Trump's assertion that border adjustments are "too complicated," their chief advantage is their simplicity. Accurately assessing taxes on worldwide income is hard. Companies routinely engage in practices that purposely lower taxable profits. In particular, importers may overstate the value of their imports and exporters may understate the value of their exports. In a world where many companies have overseas subsidiaries, such "transfer pricing" machinations are easy to pull off. Border adjustments eliminate such incentives in one fell swoop. Recall that with a border adjustment, taxes are assessed on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs - both of which the IRS has the means to monitor. Yes, a U.S. company that overstates imports will be able to report a lower gross profit to the IRS, but now it will be on the hook for a higher import tax. What it puts in one pocket it takes from the other. Likewise, an exporter that understates its overseas sales will end up with a lower gross profit, but will now receive a smaller subsidy. Q: And I suppose that because the U.S. imports more than it exports, the border adjustment will end up raising additional revenues? A: That is correct. The annual U.S. trade deficit currently stands at $500 billion. A border adjustment tax rate of 20% would thus raise $100 billion in additional revenue. Given that the corporate income tax brings in about $350 billion, this would allow corporate taxes to be substantially cut without any loss in overall revenue. And this calculation excludes any indirect revenue that would accrue to the Treasury from reducing the incentive for U.S. companies to engage in profit-shifting behavior. Keep in mind, however, that the revenue boost from the border adjustment will decline if the U.S. trade deficit narrows over time. To the extent that the U.S. must finance its trade deficit through the sale of assets such as stocks, bonds, and property, it is possible that foreigners will one day decide to swap all these assets in exchange for U.S. goods. This would lead to an improvement in the U.S. trade balance. Indeed, to the extent that the U.S. is a net debtor to the rest of the world, it is possible that the average future U.S. trade balance will be positive. If that were to happen, the government would lose revenue from the border adjustment over the long haul. Meanwhile, a 25% appreciation in the greenback would reduce the dollar value of the assets that Americans hold abroad, without much of a corresponding decline in U.S. external liabilities. A reasonable estimate is that this would impose a paper loss on the U.S. of about 13% of GDP.1 Q: Ouch! But this assumes that a 20% border adjustment tax will lead to a 25% appreciation in the dollar. That is a mighty big can opener your fellow economists are assuming! What's to say this actually happens? A: Good point. Less than 10% of the turnover in the global foreign exchange market is directly related to the cross-border trade in goods and services. The rest represents financial market transactions. There are many things that can influence the value of the dollar beside trade flows. For example, suppose the government introduces a border adjustment tax, but the Federal Reserve fails to raise rates sufficiently fast in response to rising inflation stemming from a narrowing trade deficit. In that case, U.S. real rates could actually decline, leading to a weaker dollar. Our sense is that this won't happen, but the point is that there is no automatic link between a border tax and the dollar. Much depends on how the Fed responds and the underlying economic conditions. And even if the Fed does hike rates to keep the economy from overheating, two important forces will limit the extent of any dollar appreciation: First, questions about the timing and magnitude of the border adjustment tax - including the possibility that such a measure could be reversed by a future Congress - are likely to lead to only a partial appreciation in the dollar. Second, other central banks - particularly in emerging markets - are liable to take steps to limit the dollar's ascent so as not to place too great a burden on borrowers with dollar-denominated debt. Q: So what happens to countries with hard currency pegs to the dollar? Borrowers with dollar-denominated loans will be spared, but won't these countries end up suffering due to a sharp loss of competitiveness against other economies that have more flexible currencies? A: Correct. It is damned if you do, damned if you don't. Assuming that countries with exchange rate pegs to the dollar are strong enough to fend off a speculative attack, they will still need to engineer an equivalent real depreciation of their currencies via a decline in their nominal wages relative to U.S. wages - what economists call an "internal devaluation." That could impose a deflationary impulse on those economies. Q: You're losing me. A: Think about an extreme case - one where all countries have currency pegs to the dollar. How would the economic adjustment to a U.S. border tax work then? The answer is that initially, a tax on U.S. imports, combined with a subsidy on U.S. exports, would lead to a smaller trade deficit. This would cause the U.S. economy to overheat, putting upward pressure on prices and wages. By definition, an improving trade balance in the U.S. implies a worsening trade balance in the rest of the world. This would sap demand in other countries, putting downward pressure on prices and wages abroad. The adjustment will be complete only after relative wages have shifted enough to restore the U.S. trade balance to its original level. The important point is that in a world where some countries have flexible exchange rates while others have fixed exchange rates or dirty floats, the economic adjustment to a U.S. border tax will come through some combination of a stronger nominal dollar, higher U.S. inflation, and lower inflation abroad. Q: Bullish for the dollar, but bearish for U.S. bonds, correct? A: Precisely. The degree to which bond yields adjust around the world depends on the extent to which nominal exchange rates and domestic prices are sticky. If exchange rates are slow to change, more of the adjustment has to occur through higher inflation in the U.S. and lower inflation everywhere else. But even if nominal exchange rates adjust quickly, sticky goods prices would still push up U.S. bond yields. To see this point, consider what would happen if the dollar appreciated by 25% in response to the introduction of a border adjustment tax, but neither import prices nor export prices (expressed in U.S. dollars) changed. If that were to happen, the profit margins of U.S. importers would tumble because they would now have to pay an import tax but would not benefit from lower import prices. Meanwhile, the margins of U.S. exporters would soar as export prices stayed firm and they received a subsidy from the government. The result would be less imports and more exports, and hence, an improved trade balance. This would raise U.S. aggregate demand and put upward pressure on inflation and Treasury yields. Considering that 97% of U.S. exports and 93% of U.S. imports are denominated in dollars, such an outcome is hardly far-fetched. The bottom line is that in the "real world," the introduction of a border adjustment tax would cause Treasurys to sell off and the dollar to rally. Q: What sort of numbers are we talking about? A: Assuming a 20% border tax is introduced, a reasonable guess is that the trade-weighted dollar would rise by 10% over a 12-month period above and beyond our current forecast of a 5% gain. This would imply 15% upside from current levels. The 10-year Treasury yield would probably rise to about 3%. Q: It still puzzles me how you can claim that bond yields will rise if the dollar strengthens. Wouldn't a stronger dollar normally lead to lower bond yields? A: Your premise is wrong. It is not the stronger dollar that leads to higher bond yields. It is a third factor - namely the improvement in the trade balance arising from the decision to tax imports and subsidize exports - that causes both the dollar and bond yields to rise. This is similar to what happens when the government loosens fiscal policy. Mind you, at some point the positive correlation between the dollar and bond yields could break down. If the dollar rises too much, emerging markets will crumble under the stress. This will trigger safe-haven flows into the Treasury market, leading to a stronger dollar and lower yields. Such an outcome is not our base case, but it cannot be dismissed. Q: Got it. Presuming that the global economy holds up, it sounds like a border tax would be great news for Boeing, but bad news for Walmart? A: Yes, but there are two important qualifications to consider. First, it is possible that the dollar overshoots its new long-term equilibrium level, so that the pain to Boeing from the appreciation of the greenback ends up outweighing the benefits from the export subsidy it receives. Second, given the potential economic and financial dislocations from the shift to a destination-based tax system, there is likely to be some delay between when the tax bill is signed into law and when it is implemented. And even once implementation begins, the adjustment in tax rates may be phased in only gradually. Since the dollar will rise in anticipation of all this, it is possible that exporters will actually suffer initially, while importers receive a temporary boost to profits. Nevertheless, we think that investors will see through the near-term hit to exporter margins and focus on the medium-term gains. As such, equity investors should maintain a preference for exporting companies over those that heavily rely on imports (Chart 1). Q: This assumes that the market has not fully priced in this outcome already. What are the chances that this border adjustment tax proposal actually sees the light of day? A: The border tax idea originated in the House of Representatives and has its strongest support there. There might be more opposition in the Senate, but this could be overcome if enough Democrats with protectionist leanings can be found. President Trump panned the idea in an interview with the Wall Street Journal earlier this week.2 He noted that "Anytime I hear about border adjustment, I don't love it... because usually it means we're going to get adjusted into a bad deal. That's what happens." Trump's comments suggest he may not fully understand how border adjustments work. This implies that he might be persuaded to go along with the idea if Republican legislators are able to reach a "great deal" on adjustments in his eyes, whatever that means. Subjectively, we would assign 50% probability to a border tax being introduced in some form or another, although our sense is that it will be somewhat watered down so as not to generate major dislocations for the economy. This might entail excluding certain types of imports from a border tax if they are consumed disproportionately by the poor or represent an important input for U.S. manufacturing firms. Apparel and energy products would probably be on that list. It might also entail reducing the border adjustment tax to a lower level, say 10%, as Tom Barrack, head of Donald Trump's inaugural committee, has suggested. It is hard to know how much of this is already reflected in asset prices. The dollar fell after the WSJ article was published, but that may have had less to do with border adjustments and more to do with Trump's comment that he prefers a weaker dollar - an unprecedented statement for a U.S. president. Goldman Sachs' securities group has constructed two baskets using firm-level data, one comprised of "destination tax winners" and the other of "destination tax losers."3 The loser basket actually outperformed in the immediate aftermath of the election. While the relative performance of the winner basket has recovered more recently, it still remains below where it was last April (Chart 2). The limited reaction to the prospect of a border adjustment tax has been echoed in the fact that market expectations of the future volatility of the dollar has not changed much since the election, despite the possibility that the coming legislative debate could lead to wild swings in the greenback (Chart 3). Chart 3Dollar Volatility Has Not Escalated On balance, we conclude that investors are understating the likelihood of even a watered down border adjustment tax being introduced as part of a comprehensive tax reform program. This is broadly consistent with our client discussions, which have revealed that most investors - with a few notable exceptions - are only vaguely aware of the issue. Q: Won't the WTO rule against a border adjustment tax? That could explain why investors are discounting it. A: Yes, it probably will. The WTO permits border adjustments in the case of "indirect" taxes such VATs, but not in the case of direct taxes such as income or corporate profit taxes. Granted, the U.S. has brushed off WTO decisions in the past, such as when it ignored the trade body's ruling that U.S. laws restricting internet gambling contravened the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Considering that Donald Trump threatened to pull the U.S. out of the WTO during the election campaign, such an outcome cannot be easily dismissed. Nevertheless, given the magnitude of the border tax issue, even the Trump administration is likely to think twice about running afoul of WTO rules. Nevertheless, it might be possible to modify the border adjustment proposal to make it WTO-compliant. The distinction between direct and indirect taxes is one of those things self-styled experts like to pretend is important, but is not. It does not really matter whether a tax is levied on the sale of a good or service, or whether it is levied on income. In the end, someone has to pay the tax - be it a worker or a shareholder. The adoption by the U.S. of a border-adjusted destination tax would move the global economy in the direction of greater harmonization, not away from it. As noted at the outset, most other countries border adjust their value-added taxes. They do this so that their VATs mirror a consumption tax, as Table 2 illustrates with a simple example. Conceptually, a corporate cash flow tax coupled with a payroll tax functions in much the same way as a VAT (bottom part of Table 2). The U.S. already has both a corporate income and a payroll tax, so it is not that far away from having a VAT. All that is missing is a few tweaks to depreciation rules and the addition of the border adjustment. Yes, the dollar would strengthen if that were to happen, but this would put the greenback on par with other currencies. Chart 4 shows that the U.S. has run a trade deficit with the rest of the G7 since 1990, despite the fact that the dollar has traded on average 9% below its Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) over this period. One of the reasons this has occurred is that other G7 economies have a VAT, whereas the U.S. does not (Chart 5). This has kept the dollar weaker than it otherwise would have been. Chart 4The Dollar Was Cheap For A Reason Q: Okay, let's wrap this up. What are the main investment implications I should take away from this? A: Our main takeaway is that investors are underestimating the likelihood that the U.S. adopts a destination-based tax system. This suggests that the risks to the dollar are to the upside, as are the risks to U.S. Treasury yields. Global investors should underweight U.S. bonds on a currency-hedged basis. The implications for global equities are more nuanced. It may take some time for the dollar to adjust to the border tax. This, combined with the fact that import and export prices tend to be sticky in the short run, implies that the U.S. trade deficit will decline, boosting U.S. aggregate demand in the process. While that is potentially good news for U.S. corporate profits, the benefits will be curtailed by the fact that the U.S. economy is approaching full employment. This means that any further stimulus could simply result in higher real wages for workers without any offsetting increase in unit sales for U.S. companies. A shrinking U.S. trade deficit will diminish America's role as "the global consumer of last resort." This is problematic for export-dependent emerging markets. While a border adjustment may be justifiable on economic grounds, politically, it could be seen as the first volley in a global trade war. This could sour sentiment towards EM stocks. To make matters worse, a stronger dollar would harm emerging markets with high levels of dollar-denominated debt such as Turkey, Malaysia, and Chile, while also weighing on commodity prices. We recommend that investors underweight EM stocks relative to their DM counterparts. With these considerations in mind, we are closing our long Chinese banks trade for a gain of 32% and our long RUB/USD trade for a gain of 20%. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 U.S. external assets amount to 133% of GDP, while foreign liabilities stand at 175% of GDP. About 68% of U.S. external assets are denominated in foreign currency, compared with only 16% of external liabilities. Thus, the paper loss to the U.S. from a 25% appreciation in the dollar would be (175*0.16-133*0.68)*(1-1/1.25) = 12.5% of GDP. 2 Please see "Donald Trump Warns On House Republican Tax Plan," The Wall Street Journal, dated January 16, 2017, available at www.wsj.com. 3 The Bloomberg tickers for these baskets are GSCBDTW1 and GSCBDTL1. For more information, please see "US Daily: What Policy Changes Is The Equity Market Expecting?" Goldman Sachs Economic Research, dated January 11, 2017.
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Media stocks are poised to challenge previous relative performance highs as sales growth reaccelerates. Stay overweight. The materials sector has lagged behind the commodity price rally, a sign of underlying weakness rather than latent strength. Chemicals overcapacity will remain a headwind until U.S. competitiveness improves. Stay clear. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1Sector Performance Returns (%) Feature The broad market has been very strong since the November election. While advance/decline lines have firmed, participation in the rally has been uneven and may be fraying around the edges. For example, the number of groups trading above their 40-week moving average has been diverging negatively from the broad market in the last few months, suggesting diminishing breadth (Chart 1). In fact, the industrials (I) and financials (F) sectors have carried the market since November. Other deep cyclical sectors, such as energy, materials and tech, have mostly matched market performance. The 'IF' rally is based on an expected upgrade to the economic growth plane that matches the surge in various sentiment gauges. If validation does not occur, then the IF rally will become iffy indeed, unless sector breadth improves. Last week we showed that market cap-to-GDP was so far above its long-term average that even if nominal growth boomed at 8% per annum for the next five years this valuation ratio would still not have normalized. That valuation backdrop may not upend additional short-term market momentum, but it is a true measure of just how bullish sentiment has become and should be a critical input to the portfolio construction process, because of its warning about divergences from fundamental supports. Another unconventional sentiment gauge is observed from sub-surface market patterns. Chart 1 shows that the number of defensive groups with a positive 52-week rate of change, in relative terms, is in freefall, plunged to virtually nil. In the last two decades, investors eschewing capital preservation and non-cyclical sectors so aggressively has typically preceded major market peaks (Chart 1). The steep drop in the put/call ratio confirms that euphoria and greed are trumping mistrust and fear. The put/call ratio has recently bounced, but is well below levels that signal investors are accumulating significant portfolio protection. The Fed's tightening bias, contracting U.S. dollar-based financial liquidity amid the strong U.S. dollar all threaten to keep a lid on corporate sector sales prospects. As such, we remain biased toward non-cyclical and consumer sectors, even excluding fiscal policy uncertainty. Chart 2 shows that these areas are in a base-building phase, in relative terms, following their post-election drubbing. We expect momentum to steadily build toward sustained outperformance by midyear. Conversely, a reversal in the 'IF' sectors already appears to be developing, while other capital spending-dependent sectors are unable to gain momentum (Chart 3). This week we highlight both a winning group and an area we expect to disappoint. Chart 1The Rally Is Fraying Around The Edges Chart 2Defensive Base-Building? Chart 3Cyclical Sector Distribution New Highs Ahead For Media While the consumer discretionary sector has a poor track record during Fed tightening cycles, the S&P media sub-component can buck this trend. Media stocks outperformed in the second half of the 1990s and also trended higher in the 1980s while the Fed was tightening. The key was the U.S. dollar (Chart 4). As long as the dollar was strong, media companies sustained a profit advantage over the rest of the corporate sector owing to limited external exposure. A replay is currently playing out, and has the potential to persist for at least the next few quarters based on upbeat cyclical indicators. Media sales growth is in recovery mode. Consumers have significantly boosted spending on media services, as measured by personal consumption expenditures data (Chart 5). Pricing power has surged in response to demand strength (Chart 5, bottom panel). In turn, strong demand is boosting measures of productivity: our proxy for sales/employment is accelerating toward the double-digit growth zone (Chart 5). Productivity is diverging positively from relative forward earnings expectations, implying there is room for a re-rating. As long as the U.S. economy is growing, media companies should be able to garner an increasing share of consumer wallets. Chart 6 shows that real spending on media services has been in a steady uptrend for well over a decade, reflecting its ability to continually innovate, only pausing during recessions when consumers are forced to retrench. Typically, a rise in spending pulls up pricing power (Chart 6). Chart 4Media Stocks Like Dollar Strength Chart 5Sales Are Set To Accelerate Chart 6Secular Strength All of this has spurred a recovery in media cash flow growth (Chart 7, top panel). Relative performance and cash flow move hand-in-hand. Rising cash flows also imply that the media sector can further reduce shares outstanding through buybacks and/or M&A activity (Chart 7), bolstering ROE. The S&P movies & entertainment index has been one of the driving forces behind the broader media index recovery. We upgraded the former to overweight after the vicious selloff related to Disney's ESPN woes and the takeover saga at Viacom had pushed the index to an undervalued extreme. While slightly early, this upgrade is now paying off (Chart 8). The expectations hurdle remains surmountable. Both forward earnings and sales growth estimates are deeply negative (Chart 8), reflecting the well-known cooling in cable subscriber growth. But even here, there is room for potential upside surprises. Consumer spending on recreation has been growing at a low single-digit clip, but the surge in consumer confidence, courtesy of rising wage growth and a positive wealth effect from rising real estate and financial asset prices, should support increased discretionary consumer spending. The message from the jump in the ISM services index is bullish for recreation spending (Chart 9, second panel). Chart 7Shareholder-Friendly Chart 8Cheap With Low Expectations Chart 9Still Early In The Recovery In turn, faster spending would support ongoing pricing power gains (Chart 9). The industry is already sporting one of the most robust selling price increases of all that we track, as advertising rate inflation is growing anew. Importantly, real outlays on cable services have recovered after a steep decline (Chart 9), suggesting that the drag from disappointing cable subscriber growth and cord cutting may be easing. Less churn implies more pricing power. Content cost inflation also remains under wraps. The implication is that the fundamental forces to propel a retest of previous relative performance highs are in place. Technical conditions are also sending a bullish signal. Cyclical momentum, as measured by the 52-week rate of change, is on the cusp of breaking into positive territory (Chart 9), while the share price ratio has already crossed decisively above key resistance at its 40-week moving average. A dual breakout would confirm a new bull trend. Bottom Line: Media stocks have good odds of retesting previous relative performance highs as discretionary consumer spending perks up. Stay overweight the overall media group, and the S&P movies and entertainment index in particular. Chemical Stocks: A Toxic Portfolio Blend The commodity price recovery has not carried over into the S&P materials sector, as relative performance has been moving laterally for much of the last twelve months. Rather than view this as an opportunity to play catch up, the more likely outcome is that the sector has missed its chance to outperform. In fact, downside risks have intensified. The strong U.S. dollar will exact a toll on U.S. exporters, particularly if emerging markets and China do not experience accelerating final demand. While there has been a massive amount of stimulus in China over the past 18 months, the thrust of that impulse is fading. Fiscal spending growth has dropped sharply and the authorities trying to cool rampant real estate speculation. The yield curve remains flat (Chart 10), as local funding costs rise on the back of the authorities attempt to mitigate capital outflows, and loan demand remains weak. Persistent weakness in the Chinese currency may reflect a lack of confidence in local returns, i.e. sub-par growth. All of that argues against expecting a major impetus to raw materials demand, at a time when the materials sector total wage bill is inflating more aggressively. Our Cyclical Macro Indicator for the materials sector is hitting new lows (Chart 10), heralding earnings underperformance, underscoring that below-benchmark allocations remain appropriate. The S&P chemicals group represents for than 70% of the overall materials market cap. It has underperformed since its peak and our underweight call in 2014, pulled lower by the soaring U.S. dollar and sagging industry productivity (Chart 11). Net earnings revisions have been consistently revised lower over the past few years, and are unlikely to recover without a reflationary push (global real yields are shown inverted, second panel, Chart 11) that revives chemical final demand. Analysts have latched on to the firming in global purchasing manager survey sentiment, aggressively pushing up sales growth expectations in recent months (Chart 12). Clearly, manufacturing sector expansion is expected to reverse the contraction in chemical output growth (Chart 12). Chart 10Higher PMIs Are Not Enough Chart 11Higher Yields Are A Bad Omen Chart 12Expectations Are Inflated However, this may be yet another case of analysts chronically overestimating the industry's earnings power. Global manufacturing improvement seems likely to accrue mostly to firms outside the U.S. Chart 13 shows that chemicals relative performance is heavily influenced by the U.S. dollar. Valuations and sentiment are tightly linked with chemical export growth (Chart 13), as the latter represent 14% of total U.S. exports. The U.S. dollar surge is diverting orders away from U.S. manufacturers: German chemical new orders have surged, and the IFO survey of chemical industry executives signals optimism about the future (Chart 14). Chart 13The Dollar Is Hurting The U.S. ... Chart 14... But Helping Foreign Competitors U.S. executives appear to be equally confident, but that optimism is misplaced. The American Chemical Council expects U.S. chemical exports to increase 7% a year through 2021. Over $170B is expected to be invested in U.S. chemical manufacturing capacity, representing nearly 25% of the total industry size, which is anticipated to boost the chemical trade surplus to new records. So far, roughly $76B of projects has either been completed or is under construction. If these planned projects all come to fruition, our concern is that new capacity will be idle rather than productive. The industry is in the crosshairs of anti-globalization and protectionism, and a strong U.S. dollar and rising domestic cost structures threaten to reduce competitiveness. Chemical imports are a fairly large portion of sales, rendering profitability vulnerable should an import-tax ever be introduced. From a cyclical standpoint, deflationary pressures are already very acute. Chemical capacity is growing much faster than production, warning that pricing power will be under significant pressure (Chart 15). Many chemical products are destined for interest rate-sensitive end markets such as autos, underscoring that a Fed tightening cycle is a headwind. While capacity expansion was planned when interest rates and feedstock costs were expected to remain at rock bottom levels for the foreseeable future, this is no longer the case. Chemical companies can either use natural gas (ethane) or oil (naphtha) as a primary feedstock. U.S. production is largely ethane-based, while global capacity is geared to naphtha. Rising U.S. natural gas prices are undermining the U.S. input cost advantage (Chart 16). Chart 15Persistent Deflation Pressures Chart 16U.S. Cost Structures Are Unattractive Increased capacity has also put significant upward pressure on wage costs, as our proxy for the total wage bill is rising at a high single-digit rate (Chart 16). With capital spending slated to stay robust in the coming years, it will likely continue to take a larger share of sales, impairing profit margins. While the planned merger between heavyweights Dow Chemical and Dupont may eventually help to rationalize costs, this is a necessary but not sufficient step in the face of a loss of global market share. Without accelerating sales, U.S. chemical makers will be hard pressed to improve productivity sufficiently to reverse the slide in relative forward earnings estimates. Bottom Line: The S&P materials sector hasn't been able to outperform during a period of improving global manufacturing activity, raising doubts about its performance potential when global output growth inevitably slows. Part of this reflects the challenging outlook for the sector heavyweight chemicals index, and we recommend staying underweight both. The symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CHEM - APD, ARG, CF, DOW, EMN, ECL, DD, FMC, IFF, LYB, MON, MOS, PPG, PX, SHW. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps. Favor growth over value (downgrade alert).
Special Report Highlights House Republicans are pushing for a radical overhaul of the existing tax code, including adding a "border adjustment" mechanism that would effectively subsidize exports and tax imports. Despite President Trump's apparent mixed feelings about border taxation, we see a 50% chance that some version of the proposal will be implemented. This is a higher probability than the market currently is discounting. The trade-weighted dollar will rally by another 5% even in the absence of any tax changes, but could rise by 15% if the border adjustment tax is introduced. If the latter were to happen, it would take some time for the dollar to rise to its new equilibrium level. This, in conjunction with sticky import and export prices, would likely lead to a temporary narrowing of the U.S. trade deficit. Such an outcome could prompt the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would. Investors should underweight U.S. bonds on a currency-hedged basis. A stronger dollar will push down commodity prices and hurt external borrowers with dollar-denominated loans. A protectionist backlash against the U.S. might ensue. We are closing our long Chinese banks trade for a gain of 32%, and our long RUB/USD trade for a gain of 20%. Feature Making The Tax Code Great Again? Republicans in Congress are proposing an ambitious revamp of the tax code. A central element of their plan is the replacement of the existing corporate income tax with a so-called "destination-based cash flow tax." Key features of this plan include: Cutting the current federal corporate tax from a top rate of 35% to 20%. Allowing businesses to depreciate capital expenditures immediately, rather than writing them off over many years. Disallowing businesses from deducting interest expenses when calculating their tax bills. Moving to a system of territorial taxation, meaning that taxes would only be assessed on the value added of goods consumed in the United States. Since not all goods that are produced in the U.S. are consumed in the U.S., and not all goods that are consumed in the U.S. are produced in the U.S., a destination-based system requires what is known as a "border adjustment." Such an adjustment would tax the value added of imports and rebate the value added of exports at an equivalent rate. While border adjustments are routinely used in other settings - most notably by countries that have VATs - their application to corporate income taxes is a novel idea. As such, it is not surprising that the proposal has generated significant confusion among investors. With that in mind, we offer our thoughts on the matter using a Q&A format. Q: How exactly would a border adjustment on corporate income taxes work? A: Under current U.S. law, corporate income taxes are assessed on worldwide profits, which are the difference between worldwide revenues and worldwide costs. The introduction of a border tax adjustment would change the tax system to one where taxes are assessed only on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs (i.e., revenues derived in the U.S. minus costs incurred in the U.S.). Table 1 offers a simplified example to illustrate this point. Consider three types of companies: 1) A purely domestic producer whose revenues and costs are realized at home; 2) An exporter whose revenues are entirely derived from abroad but whose costs are all incurred in the U.S.; 3) An importer whose revenues are completely generated in the U.S. but whose costs are all incurred abroad. Suppose that all three companies have revenues of $100 and costs of $60 - implying $40 in pre-tax profits - and face a corporate tax rate of 20%. Before the border adjustment, each company would pay a tax of $8 ($40 times 0.2). The border adjustment is zero for the domestic producer. However, it would impose an additional tax of $12 on the importer ($60 times 0.2), while giving the exporter a rebate of $20 ($100 times 0.2). In the end, the importer and exporter face final tax bills of $20 and -$12, respectively, while the domestic producer continues to pay $8. Note that this conforms with the tax paid on domestic revenues minus domestic costs (for the domestic producer, domestic revenue minus domestic cost is equal to $40; for the exporter it is equal to -$60; and for the importer, it is equal to $100). Q: A tax on imports and a subsidy on exports? Sounds like massive protectionism! A: That depends on the extent to which the dollar appreciates. As Table 1 shows, if the dollar appreciates by 1/(1-tax rate) = 1/(1-0.2) = 25%, there would be no impact on the trade balance or on the distribution of after-tax corporate profits in the economy. This is because the stronger dollar would nullify the subsidy on exports, while reducing import costs by precisely the amount necessary to restore importers' after-tax profits to their original level. Q: This seems like splitting hairs. If a country imposes a 20% tax on imports, most people would still regard this as a protectionist act, even if a currency appreciation offsets the impact. A: That's why a corresponding export subsidy is necessary. That may sound strange since export subsidies are also seen as protectionist measures, but consider the following: Imagine that the government only taxes imports. A tax on imports would curb import demand, implying less demand for foreign currency. This would push up the value of the dollar, leading to lower import prices. How high would the dollar go? Suppose it rose so much that the decline in import prices exactly offset the tariff, thereby restoring import volumes (and importer profits) back to their original level. Is that a stable equilibrium? The answer is no because a stronger dollar would also reduce the demand for U.S. exports, causing the trade deficit to swell. Thus, for the trade balance to remain unchanged, the dollar would have to rise only part of the way, leaving importers worse off than before the tariff was introduced. Such a policy would be protectionist because it would favor U.S.-based companies that produce for the domestic market over foreign exporters. Only in the case where importers are subject to a tax and exporters receive a subsidy will the dollar strengthen to the point that neither exports nor imports change. Intuitively, this is because an export subsidy indirectly benefits importers by pushing up the value of the dollar, while directly benefiting exporters by offsetting the effect of a stronger dollar on profits. Q: If there is no change in the trade balance, what is the advantage of border-adjusting the corporate income tax? A: Contrary to Donald Trump's assertion that border adjustments are "too complicated," their chief advantage is their simplicity. Accurately assessing taxes on worldwide income is hard. Companies routinely engage in practices that purposely lower taxable profits. In particular, importers may overstate the value of their imports and exporters may understate the value of their exports. In a world where many companies have overseas subsidiaries, such "transfer pricing" machinations are easy to pull off. Border adjustments eliminate such incentives in one fell swoop. Recall that with a border adjustment, taxes are assessed on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs - both of which the IRS has the means to monitor. Yes, a U.S. company that overstates imports will be able to report a lower gross profit to the IRS, but now it will be on the hook for a higher import tax. What it puts in one pocket it takes from the other. Likewise, an exporter that understates its overseas sales will end up with a lower gross profit, but will now receive a smaller subsidy. Q: And I suppose that because the U.S. imports more than it exports, the border adjustment will end up raising additional revenues? A: That is correct. The annual U.S. trade deficit currently stands at $500 billion. A border adjustment tax rate of 20% would thus raise $100 billion in additional revenue. Given that the corporate income tax brings in about $350 billion, this would allow corporate taxes to be substantially cut without any loss in overall revenue. And this calculation excludes any indirect revenue that would accrue to the Treasury from reducing the incentive for U.S. companies to engage in profit-shifting behavior. Keep in mind, however, that the revenue boost from the border adjustment will decline if the U.S. trade deficit narrows over time. To the extent that the U.S. must finance its trade deficit through the sale of assets such as stocks, bonds, and property, it is possible that foreigners will one day decide to swap all these assets in exchange for U.S. goods. This would lead to an improvement in the U.S. trade balance. Indeed, to the extent that the U.S. is a net debtor to the rest of the world, it is possible that the average future U.S. trade balance will be positive. If that were to happen, the government would lose revenue from the border adjustment over the long haul. Meanwhile, a 25% appreciation in the greenback would reduce the dollar value of the assets that Americans hold abroad, without much of a corresponding decline in U.S. external liabilities. A reasonable estimate is that this would impose a paper loss on the U.S. of about 13% of GDP.1 Q: Ouch! But this assumes that a 20% border adjustment tax will lead to a 25% appreciation in the dollar. That is a mighty big can opener your fellow economists are assuming! What's to say this actually happens? A: Good point. Less than 10% of the turnover in the global foreign exchange market is directly related to the cross-border trade in goods and services. The rest represents financial market transactions. There are many things that can influence the value of the dollar beside trade flows. For example, suppose the government introduces a border adjustment tax, but the Federal Reserve fails to raise rates sufficiently fast in response to rising inflation stemming from a narrowing trade deficit. In that case, U.S. real rates could actually decline, leading to a weaker dollar. Our sense is that this won't happen, but the point is that there is no automatic link between a border tax and the dollar. Much depends on how the Fed responds and the underlying economic conditions. And even if the Fed does hike rates to keep the economy from overheating, two important forces will limit the extent of any dollar appreciation: First, questions about the timing and magnitude of the border adjustment tax - including the possibility that such a measure could be reversed by a future Congress - are likely to lead to only a partial appreciation in the dollar. Second, other central banks - particularly in emerging markets - are liable to take steps to limit the dollar's ascent so as not to place too great a burden on borrowers with dollar-denominated debt. Q: So what happens to countries with hard currency pegs to the dollar? Borrowers with dollar-denominated loans will be spared, but won't these countries end up suffering due to a sharp loss of competitiveness against other economies that have more flexible currencies? A: Correct. It is damned if you do, damned if you don't. Assuming that countries with exchange rate pegs to the dollar are strong enough to fend off a speculative attack, they will still need to engineer an equivalent real depreciation of their currencies via a decline in their nominal wages relative to U.S. wages - what economists call an "internal devaluation." That could impose a deflationary impulse on those economies. Q: You're losing me. A: Think about an extreme case - one where all countries have currency pegs to the dollar. How would the economic adjustment to a U.S. border tax work then? The answer is that initially, a tax on U.S. imports, combined with a subsidy on U.S. exports, would lead to a smaller trade deficit. This would cause the U.S. economy to overheat, putting upward pressure on prices and wages. By definition, an improving trade balance in the U.S. implies a worsening trade balance in the rest of the world. This would sap demand in other countries, putting downward pressure on prices and wages abroad. The adjustment will be complete only after relative wages have shifted enough to restore the U.S. trade balance to its original level. The important point is that in a world where some countries have flexible exchange rates while others have fixed exchange rates or dirty floats, the economic adjustment to a U.S. border tax will come through some combination of a stronger nominal dollar, higher U.S. inflation, and lower inflation abroad. Q: Bullish for the dollar, but bearish for U.S. bonds, correct? A: Precisely. The degree to which bond yields adjust around the world depends on the extent to which nominal exchange rates and domestic prices are sticky. If exchange rates are slow to change, more of the adjustment has to occur through higher inflation in the U.S. and lower inflation everywhere else. But even if nominal exchange rates adjust quickly, sticky goods prices would still push up U.S. bond yields. To see this point, consider what would happen if the dollar appreciated by 25% in response to the introduction of a border adjustment tax, but neither import prices nor export prices (expressed in U.S. dollars) changed. If that were to happen, the profit margins of U.S. importers would tumble because they would now have to pay an import tax but would not benefit from lower import prices. Meanwhile, the margins of U.S. exporters would soar as export prices stayed firm and they received a subsidy from the government. The result would be less imports and more exports, and hence, an improved trade balance. This would raise U.S. aggregate demand and put upward pressure on inflation and Treasury yields. Considering that 97% of U.S. exports and 93% of U.S. imports are denominated in dollars, such an outcome is hardly far-fetched. The bottom line is that in the "real world," the introduction of a border adjustment tax would cause Treasurys to sell off and the dollar to rally. Q: What sort of numbers are we talking about? A: Assuming a 20% border tax is introduced, a reasonable guess is that the trade-weighted dollar would rise by 10% over a 12-month period above and beyond our current forecast of a 5% gain. This would imply 15% upside from current levels. The 10-year Treasury yield would probably rise to about 3%. Q: It still puzzles me how you can claim that bond yields will rise if the dollar strengthens. Wouldn't a stronger dollar normally lead to lower bond yields? A: Your premise is wrong. It is not the stronger dollar that leads to higher bond yields. It is a third factor - namely the improvement in the trade balance arising from the decision to tax imports and subsidize exports - that causes both the dollar and bond yields to rise. This is similar to what happens when the government loosens fiscal policy. Mind you, at some point the positive correlation between the dollar and bond yields could break down. If the dollar rises too much, emerging markets will crumble under the stress. This will trigger safe-haven flows into the Treasury market, leading to a stronger dollar and lower yields. Such an outcome is not our base case, but it cannot be dismissed. Q: Got it. Presuming that the global economy holds up, it sounds like a border tax would be great news for Boeing, but bad news for Walmart? A: Yes, but there are two important qualifications to consider. First, it is possible that the dollar overshoots its new long-term equilibrium level, so that the pain to Boeing from the appreciation of the greenback ends up outweighing the benefits from the export subsidy it receives. Second, given the potential economic and financial dislocations from the shift to a destination-based tax system, there is likely to be some delay between when the tax bill is signed into law and when it is implemented. And even once implementation begins, the adjustment in tax rates may be phased in only gradually. Since the dollar will rise in anticipation of all this, it is possible that exporters will actually suffer initially, while importers receive a temporary boost to profits. Nevertheless, we think that investors will see through the near-term hit to exporter margins and focus on the medium-term gains. As such, equity investors should maintain a preference for exporting companies over those that heavily rely on imports (Chart 1). Q: This assumes that the market has not fully priced in this outcome already. What are the chances that this border adjustment tax proposal actually sees the light of day? A: The border tax idea originated in the House of Representatives and has its strongest support there. There might be more opposition in the Senate, but this could be overcome if enough Democrats with protectionist leanings can be found. President Trump panned the idea in an interview with the Wall Street Journal earlier this week.2 He noted that "Anytime I hear about border adjustment, I don't love it... because usually it means we're going to get adjusted into a bad deal. That's what happens." Trump's comments suggest he may not fully understand how border adjustments work. This implies that he might be persuaded to go along with the idea if Republican legislators are able to reach a "great deal" on adjustments in his eyes, whatever that means. Subjectively, we would assign 50% probability to a border tax being introduced in some form or another, although our sense is that it will be somewhat watered down so as not to generate major dislocations for the economy. This might entail excluding certain types of imports from a border tax if they are consumed disproportionately by the poor or represent an important input for U.S. manufacturing firms. Apparel and energy products would probably be on that list. It might also entail reducing the border adjustment tax to a lower level, say 10%, as Tom Barrack, head of Donald Trump's inaugural committee, has suggested. It is hard to know how much of this is already reflected in asset prices. The dollar fell after the WSJ article was published, but that may have had less to do with border adjustments and more to do with Trump's comment that he prefers a weaker dollar - an unprecedented statement for a U.S. president. Goldman Sachs' securities group has constructed two baskets using firm-level data, one comprised of "destination tax winners" and the other of "destination tax losers."3 The loser basket actually outperformed in the immediate aftermath of the election. While the relative performance of the winner basket has recovered more recently, it still remains below where it was last April (Chart 2). The limited reaction to the prospect of a border adjustment tax has been echoed in the fact that market expectations of the future volatility of the dollar has not changed much since the election, despite the possibility that the coming legislative debate could lead to wild swings in the greenback (Chart 3). Chart 3Dollar Volatility Has Not Escalated On balance, we conclude that investors are understating the likelihood of even a watered down border adjustment tax being introduced as part of a comprehensive tax reform program. This is broadly consistent with our client discussions, which have revealed that most investors - with a few notable exceptions - are only vaguely aware of the issue. Q: Won't the WTO rule against a border adjustment tax? That could explain why investors are discounting it. A: Yes, it probably will. The WTO permits border adjustments in the case of "indirect" taxes such VATs, but not in the case of direct taxes such as income or corporate profit taxes. Granted, the U.S. has brushed off WTO decisions in the past, such as when it ignored the trade body's ruling that U.S. laws restricting internet gambling contravened the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Considering that Donald Trump threatened to pull the U.S. out of the WTO during the election campaign, such an outcome cannot be easily dismissed. Nevertheless, given the magnitude of the border tax issue, even the Trump administration is likely to think twice about running afoul of WTO rules. Nevertheless, it might be possible to modify the border adjustment proposal to make it WTO-compliant. The distinction between direct and indirect taxes is one of those things self-styled experts like to pretend is important, but is not. It does not really matter whether a tax is levied on the sale of a good or service, or whether it is levied on income. In the end, someone has to pay the tax - be it a worker or a shareholder. The adoption by the U.S. of a border-adjusted destination tax would move the global economy in the direction of greater harmonization, not away from it. As noted at the outset, most other countries border adjust their value-added taxes. They do this so that their VATs mirror a consumption tax, as Table 2 illustrates with a simple example. Conceptually, a corporate cash flow tax coupled with a payroll tax functions in much the same way as a VAT (bottom part of Table 2). The U.S. already has both a corporate income and a payroll tax, so it is not that far away from having a VAT. All that is missing is a few tweaks to depreciation rules and the addition of the border adjustment. Yes, the dollar would strengthen if that were to happen, but this would put the greenback on par with other currencies. Chart 4 shows that the U.S. has run a trade deficit with the rest of the G7 since 1990, despite the fact that the dollar has traded on average 9% below its Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) over this period. One of the reasons this has occurred is that other G7 economies have a VAT, whereas the U.S. does not (Chart 5). This has kept the dollar weaker than it otherwise would have been. Chart 4The Dollar Was Cheap For A Reason Q: Okay, let's wrap this up. What are the main investment implications I should take away from this? A: Our main takeaway is that investors are underestimating the likelihood that the U.S. adopts a destination-based tax system. This suggests that the risks to the dollar are to the upside, as are the risks to U.S. Treasury yields. Global investors should underweight U.S. bonds on a currency-hedged basis. The implications for global equities are more nuanced. It may take some time for the dollar to adjust to the border tax. This, combined with the fact that import and export prices tend to be sticky in the short run, implies that the U.S. trade deficit will decline, boosting U.S. aggregate demand in the process. While that is potentially good news for U.S. corporate profits, the benefits will be curtailed by the fact that the U.S. economy is approaching full employment. This means that any further stimulus could simply result in higher real wages for workers without any offsetting increase in unit sales for U.S. companies. A shrinking U.S. trade deficit will diminish America's role as "the global consumer of last resort." This is problematic for export-dependent emerging markets. While a border adjustment may be justifiable on economic grounds, politically, it could be seen as the first volley in a global trade war. This could sour sentiment towards EM stocks. To make matters worse, a stronger dollar would harm emerging markets with high levels of dollar-denominated debt such as Turkey, Malaysia, and Chile, while also weighing on commodity prices. We recommend that investors underweight EM stocks relative to their DM counterparts. With these considerations in mind, we are closing our long Chinese banks trade for a gain of 32% and our long RUB/USD trade for a gain of 20%. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 U.S. external assets amount to 133% of GDP, while foreign liabilities stand at 175% of GDP. About 68% of U.S. external assets are denominated in foreign currency, compared with only 16% of external liabilities. Thus, the paper loss to the U.S. from a 25% appreciation in the dollar would be (175*0.16-133*0.68)*(1-1/1.25) = 12.5% of GDP. 2 Please see "Donald Trump Warns On House Republican Tax Plan," The Wall Street Journal, dated January 16, 2017, available at www.wsj.com. 3 The Bloomberg tickers for these baskets are GSCBDTW1 and GSCBDTL1. For more information, please see "US Daily: What Policy Changes Is The Equity Market Expecting?" Goldman Sachs Economic Research, dated January 11, 2017.
In early 2016, our sister publication Global Alpha Sector Strategy did a cycle-on-cycle analysis on the ISM manufacturing index and relative industrials performance in the following twelve months every time the ISM sank below the boom/bust line for 5 or more consecutive months. The conclusion was that it did not pay to underweight industrials stocks, as too much bearishness was already baked in the cake. The opposite is also true. We analyzed relative industrials performance since the early 1990s every time the ISM manufacturing new orders sub-index hit 60. The bottom panel of the chart shows median relative performance in the ensuing twelve months. The implication is that industrials stocks will suffer in the coming quarters as too much optimism is already discounted since the post-election reflex advance. Bottom Line: We reiterate our recent high-conviction underweight stance on the S&P industrials sector.
Highlights Trump's protectionism supercharges our theme of Sino-American tensions. China is at a stark disadvantage to the U.S. in a trade war. China cannot give concessions easily; it may batten down the hatches. Remain short RMB; but go long "One China," i.e. mainland stocks versus Taiwan/Hong Kong. Feature "Life's short span forbids us to enter on far reaching hopes." - Horace, Odes "Of course, you know, this means war." - Bugs Bunny, Looney Tunes President-elect Trump has said he will not designate China a "currency manipulator" on the first day of his presidency, contrary to what he promised during the campaign. Is this a sign that Trump is "normalizing" after the wild threats of his campaign? What are the real risks of a U.S.-China "trade war"? How should investors prepare? Trade War Is More Likely Than You Think BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has long cautioned investors that geopolitical tensions in East Asia were severely underestimated by the market.1 In 2013, we argued that a Sino-American military conflict was more likely than most of our clients dared to think.2 And over the past several years, in one-on-one conversations and in presentations at numerous conferences, we have stressed that tensions in East Asia could imperil the largest trade relationship. Why so alarmist? We have always based our analysis on three key pillars: Multipolarity: With the U.S. in a relative decline, containing China's rise has become a national security issue. The U.S. "Grand Strategy" operates under the imperative that no regional power is allowed to become a regional hegemon, as that would be a stepping stone to global competition. "Pivot" To Asia: The U.S. geopolitical deleveraging from the Middle East was from the start designed to free up more U.S. resources for Asia. While the Obama Administration pursued the pivot cautiously, it was putting the infrastructure in place for a confrontation with China. Regional dynamics: China is surrounded by neighbors that are cautious about Beijing's intentions for geographic, historical, and strategic reasons. They have therefore sought to balance their increasing economic addiction to China with deeper military and political links to the U.S. Chart 1China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs Trump's victory has made markets considerably less oblivious to the risks we have stressed to clients for the past five years. The idea that a trade war might erupt is now widely discussed. And Trump's repeated statements about Taiwan, North Korea, and the South China Sea have awoken some investors to the reality that a trade conflict could spill over into strategic areas, and vice versa. Nevertheless, judging by the ebullient market reaction relative to previous U.S. presidential transitions, most investors think that cool heads will inevitably prevail. They may be right, but from where we sit it is premature - and imprudent - to bet on it. Make no mistake, China, not NAFTA, will suffer the brunt of Trump's efforts to fulfill his protectionist campaign promises (Chart 1). We see 70% odds that a "crisis event" will affect U.S.-China trade patterns in a significant way over the next four years. How Did We Get Here? The Global Financial Crisis caused a sharp break in Sino-American relations: It interrupted the economic symbiosis between China and American households refused to keep re-leveraging, forcing China to become more internally driven economy (Chart 2). With final demand in the U.S. declining, China decided to re-leverage with credit, injecting its existing overproduction and overcapacity with steroids. But this only accelerated China's capture of global export market share, while supercharging the deflationary global effects (Chart 3). On top of its credit policies, China has struggled to internationalize the RMB. So now, it is not only still washing the world with its industrial overcapacity but also inadvertently - or not so innocently - reducing the prices of its goods with the weakening of its currency (Chart 4). Chart 2U.S.-China Symbiosis Has Died Chart 3China's Historic Export Grab Chart 4China Still Exporting Deflation U.S.-China trade disputes have a long history. China's WTO entrance was agreed only with the stipulation that China be treated as a "non-market economy" for 15 years. Punitive trade bills almost passed through Congress in 2005 and 2010-11, for instance, but were held back at the last minute.3 Since 2009, in particular, protectionist policies have emerged. President Obama began his term with an unprecedented use of the authority under Section 421 of the 1974 Trade Act to punish China for "market distorting" exports of car tires, and with protectionist "Buy America" provisions in his economic stimulus package. After that, a sequence of tit-for-tat punitive measures took place affecting a range of goods on both sides, attempted Chinese investments in the U.S., and American companies operating in China. China's meteoric rise, surging trade surpluses with the U.S., and the rapid loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs was the main cause of tension (Chart 5). Americans benefited from China's rise, namely from cheaper goods and lower interest rates, but it caused significant economic dislocations.4 Meanwhile Chinese protectionism discouraged American elites that had endorsed China's rise on the hopes of gradually unfolding market access. Amid the heightened political risks of the global recession and its aftermath, China intensified intellectual property theft, non-tariff barriers, indigenous innovation policies, and cyber-attacks.5 The saving grace, for markets, was that the aforementioned tensions always remained within bounds. The WTO was a mutually recognized adjudicator. Also, the rival American and Chinese commercial authorities played a slow, step-by-step, predictable game, with the punitive measures being mostly proportional. When pressures flared in the U.S., the executive branch stayed Congress's hand; meanwhile China's government could steamroll any internal opposition to its trade policies. No more. Hillary Clinton might have helped contain trade tensions, but the outlook has darkened irrespective of Trump. Notably, American multinational corporations have increasingly decried Chinese protectionism and lobbied for the U.S. government to help persuade China to give them greater market access and a better legal-regulatory climate (Chart 6). As the Obama administration exited the stage in December 2016, the U.S., Japan and others refused to accept China's "market economy" status despite the fifteen-year deadline coming due. This means the U.S. and its allies explicitly wanted to reserve the power to impose anti-dumping duties more easily on China, which is what "Non-Market Economy" status entails (Chart 7).6 China considers this delay an outright violation of U.S. commitments under WTO. Chart 5A Tale Of Two Manufacturers Chart 6American Business Under Pressure In China Chart 7China's Non-Market Status A Liability Further, Clinton had promised to create a special prosecutor for trade disputes and to triple the number of enforcement officers. More broadly, she wanted to continue Obama's "Pivot to Asia" policy that had roiled U.S.-China strategic relations. Bottom Line: U.S.-China trade relations had already turned sour as a result of the divergence of interests following the Global Financial Crisis. China has emerged as a trade juggernaut and the U.S. corporate and political establishments have become far more anxious about it recently. Now Trump has supercharged the situation. Will Trump "Normalize" In Office? With Trump, the U.S. is likely to undergo a "regime change" in terms of how trade policy is conducted - the only question is how long-lasting it will be. U.S. presidents have very few constraints on trade and foreign policy (Table 1). Ignore Trump's statements and look at his team: Incoming Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, National Trade Council chief Peter Navarro, and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer.7 This group, especially Navarro, is stridently hawkish on China and appears ready to bring the full weight of the United States' economic and strategic advantages to the table in order to negotiate a new framework of relations. Table 1Trump Is Not Constrained On Trade Policy The model is the renegotiation of trade relations with an ascendant Japan in the 1980s. And China looks ripe for a crackdown by this yardstick. The penetration of Chinese exports meet or exceed Japan's position at its peak in the 1980s (Chart 8). Meanwhile the RMB has not appreciated nearly as much as the yen had done by this time (Chart 9). Ultimately the two resolved their differences because Japan acceded to major U.S. demands, strengthening its currency after the 1985 Plaza Accord and accelerating financial liberalization. It helped that the two were staunch allies without genuine security tensions (unlike the U.S. and China today). Chart 8China Has Gotten Away ##br##With More Than Japan Did Chart 9Reagan Forced Faster ##br##Appreciation On Japanese Yen From the Trump administration's point of view, the standard trade remedies have failed given that U.S. trade deficits have deteriorated all along. True, China has made considerable structural adjustments in recent years (Chart 10). But relative to the U.S., China has not really changed its ways. In fact, the current account surplus, which has collapsed from 10% to around 2% since 2008, is now roughly equal to the trade surplus with the United States (Chart 11). Chart 10China's Economic Rebalancing Under Way Chart 11China's Trade Surplus With U.S. Indispensable Therefore we do not put much stock in Trump's claim that he will not call China a currency manipulator on day one - this does not signal a "normalization" or softening of Trump's protectionist line. There was always a technical issue with this pledge that made the timing awkward.8 The manipulator charge will remain a Sword of Damocles hanging over China this year and next, but it is also only one tool in Trump's toolkit - and not the most intimidating one either (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Calling China A Currency Manipulator: The Process At a minimum, Trump could easily do what Obama did in February 2009 on tires - simply approve recommendations from his own Treasury Department for tariffs on specific goods. At a more aggressive level, he has the example of Richard Nixon before him. Nixon imposed a 10% surcharge on all dutiable goods in 1971. We would not put it beyond Trump to take arbitrary actions within the four-year term if international economic conflicts heat up dramatically. (We will be especially leery in the lead-up to the 2018 or 2020 elections if Trump's touted deal-making is not going his way.) Congress is not likely to prove a major constraint, at least not at first. Trump's election is a strong signal that the U.S. populace wants more protectionist policies. Congressional Republicans are limited, given the laws empowering the president on trade, and they will face the reality that his electoral strategy succeeded in great part because of voter demand for protectionism in key Midwestern states. Democrats, in these and other competitive states, have to perform verbal gymnastics to oppose Trump's positions on trade that substantially echo their own. And as mentioned, U.S. multinationals are not likely to "domesticate" Trump - rather, they will lobby for relative moderation or tactfulness within his general framework. Bottom Line: Trump is relatively unconstrained on trade policy. We expect his administration to begin with a "shot across the bow" in the first 100 days - a mostly but not entirely symbolic punitive measure against China - and then to seek high-level negotiations toward a framework for the administration's relations with China over the next four years. We expect the initial shot to rattle markets, then for a calming period to ensue, which will give a false sense of security. But given the lack of constraints on Trump, we are not optimistic. What Are China's Options? In a trade war with the U.S., China is outgunned on every front. Its economy is far more vulnerable to a disruption of exports to the U.S. than vice versa (Chart 12). It does not have ready alternatives to the U.S., given that U.S. imports of Chinese goods are roughly equal to Japanese, South Korean, German, Vietnamese and British imports combined. And China is most competitive in goods that the U.S. can easily source elsewhere (Chart 13). Chart 12The Numbers Favor The U.S. In A Trade War Chart 13The U.S. Can Find Substitutes For China Yes, China can disrupt the supply chain for the iPhone, but no, the Trump administration is not going to confuse Apple's interests with what it views as the "National Interest." Certainly China will favor non-American companies - Airbus over Boeing, etc - but the U.S. growth model is not reliant on exports, so it is not clear that the Trump administration will heed Boeing's cries about long-term competitiveness. The states most exposed to Chinese retaliation - Alaska, Oregon, Washington, Louisiana, and South Carolina - will not harm his electoral base. His Midwestern Rust Belt states could suffer, according to some research, but voters there may approve of his protectionist measures and Trump's other economic policies may blunt the short-term impact of Chinese retaliation.9 Looking at major Chinese export categories to the U.S., like textiles, electrical machinery, and equipment, suggests that 30 million Chinese jobs could be affected - perhaps ten times as many as the comparable U.S. jobs at risk from Chinese retaliation (far more than proportional given population). There is one factor that stands in China's favor. The history of trade wars says something different than the raw balance of trade. Like all wars, trade wars seek political ends, and a government's internal unity and resilience can be critical to its ability to bear out the worst.10 Politically, it is not clear that the U.S. has a better stomach for a full trade war than China: The U.S. remains divided - Polarization will worsen under Trump given his low approval ratings, low favorability, narrow popular victory margin, and controversial policy inclinations. Though China-bashing and economic patriotism can win some support, and we do not expect Congress or the corporate lobby to prevent Trump from launching a trade crusade if he wishes, nevertheless we see a fair chance that Trump would lose credibility and be forced to moderate his stance once negative trade consequences began to be felt at home. China is relatively unified - Xi has set himself up to be the "core" of power in the Communist Party in anticipation of worsening domestic conditions.11 It is worth remembering that the original use of the "core leader" moniker emerged in the wake of the Tiananmen Square crackdown when the Western world imposed sanctions on a newly liberalized China and it was forced to retreat into its shell from 1989-1992 (Chart 14). China's leadership wants to make the country less dependent on the U.S., and more autarkic, but is having difficulty imposing austere changes on itself. Trump may hasten the reforms while giving Chinese leaders a convenient "foreign devil" to distract the populace from the pain of restructuring. Chart 14China Rode Out Western Pressure In 1989 The above should not suggest that China wants a trade war, however. Trump is threatening to kick the export leg out from under its growth model at a time when the other leg - investment - stands at risk from domestic credit excesses.12 But the recent case study of Russia and economic sanctions is instructive. President Vladimir Putin used sanctions to blame all of the economic ills that befell Russia on the West, even though the Kremlin was often at fault. That policy largely worked. Bottom Line: China stands to suffer the most economically in a trade war with the United States. Chinese policymakers may therefore choose to ride out the economic costs of a trade war while blaming the U.S. for the pain. But closing its economy today would derail global growth and cause a dramatic spike in geopolitical risk, unlike in 1989. Strategic Spillover Trump's approach is likely to increase geopolitical risk because he wants to use the strategic disagreements plaguing Sino-American relations as leverage to get concessions on trade. The three hot spots are: Taiwan - Tensions with Taiwan spiked when Trump revealed that his administration considers the "One China" policy to be up for negotiation. China has engaged in serious saber-rattling in response, both around Taiwan and in the South China Sea. By linking trade disputes with Taiwan, Trump likely made it harder for Xi to compromise on the former without looking weak on the latter. Trump's negotiating style may work in business, but will not work with China on Taiwan, which is a matter of sovereignty and a clear red line. North Korea - Trump has said North Korea will not manage to test an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), which it is preparing to do. He is threatening to hold China to account for not curbing the North's violations of UN resolutions on nuclear proliferation and missile development. This would likely mean an expansion of the practice adopted under Obama of sanctioning Chinese entities for dealing with North Korean partners. This situation would likely shake up markets that have normally been able to ignore North Korea. South China Sea - Trump has repeatedly signaled that China has militarized the South China Sea, and his incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson suggested that China be deprived of access, a policy that would trigger a shooting war if operationalized. Persistent tensions here are unlikely to go away anytime soon and could spark a diplomatic crisis or naval conflict (if not with the U.S. then with regional players like Vietnam). Thus Trump's administration is likely to make serious demands on China regarding its strategic situation and national security even while demanding an overhaul of trade policies that will force difficult economic reforms on China. Bottom Line: China's political strengths at home make it unlikely to compromise on Trump's major strategic demands. Contrary to adding leverage in trade negotiations - where the U.S. already has the upper hand - using these issues as negotiating tools is likely to cause China to fear for its security and thus become more defiant. Risks To The View The risk to this view would be that the U.S. and China manage to negotiate a new framework and actually improve relations, with the U.S. giving more respect to China's legitimate rights and regional initiatives in exchange for Chinese concessions. But is China capable of conceding significantly on Trump's major demands? RMB appreciation? No. Many commentators have pointed out that Trump's view of the RMB is outdated - the PBoC is now propping it up, not suppressing it. The driver of RMB weakness is China's excessive monetary and credit expansion, weakening productivity growth, domestic investors' desires to move capital out, corporate deleveraging, the need for stimulus, tightening Fed policy, and rising geopolitical risks. While it is possible that the PBoC will defend the RMB to the hilt, the near-term path of least resistance is down, and that sets China on a collision course with the Trump administration. Market access and dumping? Yes. Trump complains that China taxes U.S. imports unfairly and dumps goods into the American market, killing jobs. To appease the U.S., China could take concrete steps to remove non-tariff barriers and open wider investment avenues for U.S. businesses - it has recently suggested it might do so.13 Less likely, it could accelerate overcapacity cuts and reduce subsidies to state-owned enterprises. These moves would fit with its avowed reform goals and strengthen Chinese self-sufficiency in the long run, and Xi's administration likely has the power to do them. China could also improve intellectual property protections and declare a ceasefire on cyber-attacks on companies. All of this is possible, but clearly extremely difficult to achieve. Strategic concerns? Maybe. It is conceivable but unlikely that China could de-escalate matters in the South China Sea and agree to a "freedom of navigation" guarantee for the United States, which is not a party to the territorial disputes. A significant compromise on North Korea would be even less likely, since China is unwilling to move beyond the usual, ineffective management and impose real hardship on the regime for its violations of UN resolutions and improving nuclear and missile capabilities. One impetus for China to concede on these points is that it is fearful of creating instability in a politically sensitive year in which it will oversee a major five-year leadership rotation at its National Party Congress. Trump may deliberately threaten to disrupt the transition in order to extract concessions. Bottom Line: We operate on a constraint-based methodology: Trump has very few constraints on trade policy, China has major constraints on making these concessions, so there is no basis for assuming that the two countries will skip conflict and go directly to a new level of cooperation. Investment Recommendations We remain short the RMB. The currency has fallen by 5.62% since we initiated this trade. The trade itself has suffered a bit since the end of last year as a result of the PBoC's efforts to fight speculation. But monetary expansion sans productivity improvements continues apace in China, and we expect USD strength to persist, so we think there is room for the RMB to fall further. In the near term, however, the USD could experience further pullback as investors start pricing the negatives of the Trump administration. Therefore we are closing our long USD/EUR trade for a 4.55% gain. We remain somewhat positive on China relative to EM - because of the relative unity and centralization of its government and financial resources at its disposal - but we would not recommend investing in Chinese assets in the absolute due to the heightened internal and external risks outlined above. Hence we propose going long the "One China" policy, i.e. long Chinese mainland stocks versus Taiwan and Hong Kong (Chart 15). This enables us to play the fact that mainland valuations are depressed while the global trend of de-globalization and the conflicts within Greater China and with the U.S. are likely to increase uncertainties about Hong Kong and Taiwan. These two are particularly vulnerable to tighter regulations or sanctions from Beijing. Yan Wang, Senior Vice-President at BCA's China Investment Strategy, argues that while there is no case for a clear directional move in Chinese stocks - especially given the ongoing tightening of policies on the property sector - nevertheless they should be favored relative to global equities, given that growth is improving, fiscal policy will remain accommodative, and valuations are depressed (Chart 16).14 Meanwhile our negative outlook on China in absolute terms supports a globally negative outlook on cyclical equities relative to defensives. Cyclicals move with EM in general and China in particular. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President in charge of U.S. Equity Strategy, notes that EM performance does not warrant the sharp rise in U.S. cyclicals versus defensives, nor that in globally oriented versus domestically oriented stocks (Chart 17).15 This creates the opportunity for a tactical short. Chart 15Chinese Stocks Are Cheap Chart 16China Trades With Cyclicals Chart 17Go Long The 'One China Policy' Finally, we caution investors about investing in companies with major exposure to China (Table 2). We would recommend that clients short a "China, Inc" Index of the top 20 S&P 500 stocks exposed to trade with China relative to the rest of S&P 500. The "China, Inc" stocks have been outperforming the market for a while (Chart 18). We fear that China may retaliate against some of these firms as the trade war with the U.S. heats up. Table 2'China, Inc.' May Suffer From Trade War Chart 18Short 'China, Inc.' Relative To Market Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President, marko@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kurri, Research Analyst 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Imad Moosa, The U.S.-China Trade Dispute: Facts, Figures And Myths (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2012). 4 For prominent research on this topic, please see David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, "The China Shock: Learning From Labor-Market Adjustment To Large Changes In Trade," Annual Review of Economics 8 (2016), pp. 205-40, available at www.annualreviews.org; Autor et al., "Foreign Competition And Domestic Innovation: Evidence From U.S. Patents," NBER Working Paper No. 22879, December 2016, available at www.nber.org. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Reports, "Reflections On China's Reforms," dated December 11, 2013, and "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Scholars have shown that countries granting China market economy status have subsequently initiated fewer antidumping cases against it. Please see Francisco Urdinez and Gilmar Masiero, "China And The WTO: Will The Market Economy Status Make Any Difference After 2016?" The Chinese Economy 48:2 (2015), pp. 155-172. Technically speaking, the difference in duty rates can be substantial between market and non-market economies; please see the U.S. Government Accountability Office, "U.S.-China Trade: Eliminating Nonmarket Economy Methodology Would Lower Antidumping Duties For Some Chinese Companies," GAO-06-231, January 2006, available at www.gao.gov. 7 Ross has criticized China more heavily since joining Trump; Navarro is the author of Death By China: Confronting The Dragon, A Global Call To Action (Pearson, 2011); together they criticized China in a paper for Trump's campaign, "Scoring The Trump Economic Plan: Trade, Regulatory, & Energy Policy Impacts," dated September 29, 2016, available at assets.donaldjtrump.com. Lighthizer worked on Ronald Reagan's Treasury Department's team that engaged in the tough trade negotiations with Japan in the mid-1980s. 8 The existing statutory procedure, now enshrined in Title VII of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, involves the Treasury Department making semi-annual assessments and potentially initiating bilateral or multilateral negotiations. According to the more or less standard time frame since 1988, any charges of currency manipulation would occur in the April report at earliest, and more likely in the October report or thereafter. For Trump to have designated China a manipulator on day one, he would either have had to issue a simple statement of intent or an executive directive that bypassed the formal foreign exchange review process. 9 Please see Andy Kiersz, "Here's Every State's Biggest International Trading Partner," Business Insider, October 20, 2016, available at www.businessinsider.com. See also Marcus Noland et al, "Assessing Trade Agendas In The US Presidential Campaign," Peterson Institute for International Economics, PIIE Briefing 16-6, dated September 2016, available at piie.com. 10 Serbia "defeated" the much larger Austria-Habsburg in their "Pig War" in the early 1900s, while Ireland won most of its key demands from England despite losing the "Economic War" of the 1930s. Russia's attempts over the past decade to bully Ukraine into submission have not succeeded in achieving Russia's political aims. In each of these cases, a far greater economic disparity existed than currently exists between the U.S. and China, and yet even then the weaker country's popular support, and the willingness of neighbors to exploit the new trade opportunities that opened up, enabled the weaker country to win the political clash of wills. 11 Please see "China: Xi Is A "Core" Leader... So What?" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "De-Globalization," dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see "China unveils new plan to further open economy to foreign investment," Reuters, January 17, 2017, available at www.reuters.com. 14 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard," dated January 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "2017 High-Conviction Calls," dated January 9, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.
The sharp packaged food share price decline means that difficult conditions are now being discounted. Sales growth expectations have cratered, reflecting the negative impact of food price deflation and the strong U.S. dollar on this export-dependent industry. However, the strong currency no longer appears to be crimping demand: real exports of food and beverage products have surged in recent months. On the flipside, imports have declined, suggesting less fierce foreign competition. In addition, a strong U.S. dollar should continue to keep a lid on raw food prices. Low input commodity costs have helped propel our profit margin proxy to new cyclical highs, heralding ongoing margin expansion. The latter demonstrates impressive operating discipline amidst a tough sales backdrop. We recommend using the sell-off to lift underweight positions up to neutral. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5PACK-MDLZ, KHC, GIS, K, TSN, CAG, SJM, HSY, MJN, CPB, MKC, HRL.